 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Chapman10/16/2001
aignment which is limited to the matters prescribed in Tenn. R. Crim. P. 10 is not a critical stage. Id. at 769. The record shows that the arraignment was limited to such matters, in that the trial court merely informed the appellant of the charges against him, entered a plea of "not guilty" on the appellant's behalf and provided the appellant with a copy of the indictment. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 10(b). Thus, we conclude that the arraignment was not a "critical stage," and counsel's absence at the arraignment did not deprive the appellant of his constitutional right to counsel.
Additionally, we recognize that the appellant is statutorily entitled to "fourteen (14) full days (Sundays and legal holidays excluded) after arrest and the return of the indictment or presentment before being tried for such offense." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-105. The appellant was indicted on May 3 and was tried for this offense approximately ten (10) days later. However, in State v. Brown, 795 S.W.2d 689, 693 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), this Court observed that "the legislature intended that the delay between indictment and trial apply only where the indictment or presentment and arrest occur substantially at the same time." The appellant was arrested for this offense in January, but was indicted four (4) months later. Therefore, based upon previous holdings of this Court and our Supreme Court, we conclude that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-105, which requires a fourteen (14) day lapse between the indictment and the trial date, does not require reversal in this case. See Hood v. State, 216 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tenn. 1948); Dukes v. State, 578 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).
This issue is without merit.
IV.
After reviewing the record presented to this Court, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for a continuance. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
|