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State v. Bryant10/9/2001
n the benefit of the doubt and placed on probation, indefinitely, for underage consumption of alcohol. The court notes that the terms of his probation included the standard terms of going to school, obeying the authorities, not committing any other crimes.
There are reasonable grounds to show that the community requires that the child be put under legal restraint or discipline.
Initially, the defendant complains that the trial court failed to hold an acceptance hearing prior to his transfer. He concedes, however, that an acceptance hearing by the trial court was not required. See State v. Darden, 12 S.W.3d 455, 459 (Tenn. 2000). He also concedes that he did not file a motion for an acceptance hearing on the ground that the juvenile court judge was a non-lawyer. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(d). In consequence, this issue does not afford the defendant relief.
The defendant also asserts that "there was not sufficient information in juvenile court" to warrant transfer of this case to criminal court. We disagree. At the time of the transfer, there were reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had committed the alleged act, the premeditated murder of his father. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(4)(A). The state presented proof of, among other things, the defendant's confession to police, the recovery of the murder weapon, and the recovery of the weapon's carry permit from the defendant's commode. There is also a reasonable basis to believe that the defendant is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(4)(B).
Notwithstanding the indications of mild mental retardation, the defendant has apparently lived a relatively normal, mainstreamed life. Finally, given the gravity of the offense, as well as the defendant's prior criminal history, there is a reasonable basis for concluding that the defendant needed to be "put under legal restraint." See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134(4)(C). The transfer, in our view, was appropriate.
Finally, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by excluding testimony concerning the victim's reputation for violence. He acknowledges, however, that both he and defense witness Susan Bryant were allowed to testify about the victim's history of violent and aggressive behavior. The defendant does not cite this court to any excluded testimony which should have been admitted. Nor does he provide this court with any argument, authorities, or citations to the record. As a result, the issue has been waived. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 10(b); State v. Price, 46 S.W.3d 785, 825 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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