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State v. Vanderford12/14/2001
nd Conner. In Adkisson, id. at & 10, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation while her appeal from the underlying misdemeanor convictions was still pending and prior to the commencement of the probationary period. This court noted that the trial court did not possess jurisdiction over the case during the pendency of the appeal but further observed that, " nder Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-311(a) and the rule in Conner, a trial court could appropriately consider a probation revocation warrant based on a criminal offense committed during appeal after completion of the appeal and return of jurisdiction to the trial court." Adkisson, Nos. M2000-01079-CCA-R3-CD & M2000-02319-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1218570, at *10; cf. State v. Williams, 52 S.W.3d 109, 119-124 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
We can conceive of no reason why sound public policy should not dictate the application of the rule in Stone and Conner to the revocation of community corrections sentences. Moreover, we note that the language contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-36-106(e)(4) is broader than the corresponding language in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-310 (1997), simply providing that " he court shall . . . possess the power to revoke the sentence imposed at any time due to the conduct of the defendant." Finally, we have previously applied the rule in Stone and Conner in the context of the revocation of a community corrections sentence. State v. Charles Martin Stoots, No. 02C01-9712-CC-00464, 1998 WL 458179, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, August 7, 1998).
That having been said, due process requires that the defendant be advised of the relevant term or condition of his probation at the time of the violation precipitating revocation. State v. Stubblefield, 953 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); Smith, 909 S.W.2d at 473; Stacy Stewart v. State, No. M1999-00684-CCA-MR3-CD, 2000 WL 374756, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, April 7, 2000). Nevertheless, we also find the following principle announced by this court in Stone, 880 S.W.2d at 749, to be equally applicable in the context of community corrections revocations: Even if specific conditions of probation have not yet been placed on the defendant at the time of his commission of another offense, "an obligation not to commit a criminal violation is so inherently and patently a requirement of our citizens that it attaches to any grant of probation and . . . probationers, whether they be present or future, are put on notice, as a matter of law, that further criminal acts may result in revocation." See also Stubblefield, 953 S.W.2d at 225; Stewart, No. M1999-00684-CCA-MR3-CD, 2000 WL 374756, at *2.
Accordingly, because the appellant was clearly on notice of his sentence and the condition of his sentence that he not commit another criminal violation, the trial court had the authority to revoke community corrections in this case and did not abuse its discretion by doing so.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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