State v. Hammock10/12/2001
an essential element of a defense, however, and thus, by the rationale in Ray was not admissible as substantive proof by the terms of Rule 405(b).
In this case, the Defendant did not know the victim, nor had he seen the victim prior to the night of February 15, 1998. Thus, the Defendant would not have any knowledge of any prior specific acts of violence on the part of the victim, nor of the victim's reputation of such acts. Through his video statement to Detective Putnam, the Defendant stated that he acted to protect Brent Rollins, in that the victim was threatening Rollins with a knife. There is nothing in the trial record that reflects that two persons, Mary Browning or Brent Rollins, had informed the Defendant of the victim's past history. The Defendant contends that the cross-examination of David Thompson, a next door neighbor, would corroborate a claim that the victim was a violent person. In analyzing the proffered testimony of David Thompson, the most this witness can say is that he heard loud noises coming from the victim's apartment in the past. He does not know the source of these noises, which might indicate some fighting and arguing. He cannot say who might have been an aggressor or exactly what these encounters entailed. We cannot say, even circumstantially, that such proposed testimony rises to specific acts of violence on the part of the victim. Notwithstanding this analysis, the State conceded that on the night in question, the victim started the scuffle between he and Rollins. Thus, the victim was the first aggressor between he and Rollins. Also, the defense witness testified that Rollins had informed her, after the event, that the victim was a mean and violent man. Thus, the jury had some information before it that the victim may have some questionable past concerning some violence. In conclusion, we agree with the trial court that the proposed cross-examination of the witness, David Thompson, was not relevant. There is no merit to this issue.
PART B
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In this issue, the Defendant contends that the evidence at trial is insufficient to establish the essential elements of premeditation to support a conviction for first-degree murder. The Defendant infers that, at most, the evidence would establish second-degree murder, citing State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 539 (Tenn. 1992).
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(e) prescribes that "findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Evidence is sufficient if, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tenn. 2000). Also, a conviction by a trier of fact destroys the presumption of innocence and imposes a presumption of guilt. On appeal, a convicted criminal bears the burden of showing that the evidence was insufficient. McBee v. State, 372 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tenn. 1963); State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 105-06 (Tenn. 1999).
In its review of the evidence, an appellate court must afford the State "the strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom." State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982); Smith v. State, 24 S.W.3d at 279. The court may not "reweigh or re-evaluate the evidence" in the record below. State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d at 105. Likewise, should the reviewing court find particul
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