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State v. Garbutt12/29/2001
stablished by the Vermont courts." Id.
In Graves, the state officer was at the border station when defendant drove in, and thereafter the officer developed probable cause to believe that defendant committed the crime of DUI in his presence. Since the power to arrest in such circumstances is created by V.R.Cr.P. 3(a), a Court rule, and the officer acted pursuant to the rule, we held that the warrantless arrest was authorized by § 551. Id. at 647-48, 757 A.2d at 464.
In these cases, the state police officers did not observe defendants' operation of their vehicles. This is, however, a distinction from Graves without a difference. V.R.Cr.P. 3(a)(5) authorizes a law enforcement officer to arrest a person without a warrant "when the officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed or is committing a violation of . . . 23 V.S.A. § 1201," Vermont's DUI statute. It is uncontested that the state police officers, based on their own observations and information from the federal officers, had probable cause to believe defendants were operating their vehicles under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, the officers acted pursuant to Criminal Rule 3(a)(5) and had the judicial authorization required by § 551. The trial courts properly found that the state police officers were authorized to arrest defendants without warrants.
Second, defendants argue that the state does not have jurisdiction to prosecute these offenses because they occurred at the border inspection stations, which are federal enclaves. Defendants acknowledge that we decided this issue against their position in State v. Armstrong, but urge us to overrule Armstrong.
Whatever the merits of defendants' arguments, we do not reach them. In one of the cases, State v. James Waite, defendant failed to raise the issue below so it is not before us. In the other two cases, the respective district courts found that after entering the United States the defendant crossed a strip of land in Vermont before reaching the federal enclave. Defendants have not challenged these findings. Thus, on the records before us, the findings support the courts' conclusions that these two defendants committed DUI in Vermont outside the federal enclave. See State v. Dreibelbis, 147 Vt. 98, 99, 511 A.2d 307, 307-08 (1986) (defendant could be charged with a state drug possession offense where he left Canada, transported the drugs across a strip of state land, and then presented himself for inspection at a U.S. inspection station). Even if DUI in the federal enclave is not a Vermont crime, defendants would not be helped by such a ruling.
Finally, we turn to defendants' Miranda argument. Defendants argue that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress statements they made and the results of field sobriety tests because they were obtained without the police first advising defendants of their Miranda rights. The trial courts denied the suppression motions because they found that defendants were not in "custody."
In the Miranda decision, the Supreme Court was particularly concerned with "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 445. The Court held that before police subject criminal suspects to custodial interrogation, they must be advised of their rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning. Id. at 457-58. "By custodial interrogation," the Court explained, "we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444. Suspects not in custody are not entitled to Miranda warnings. See State v. Willis,
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