People v. DiPace9/30/2004
n arrested defendant and took him to the police station.
At the police station, Gicla continued to observe defendant before a breath alcohol analysis test was administered. The breath analysis showed that defendant had a blood-alcohol level of 0.246. The breath analysis machine had been certified as operational on February 12, 2002, and it gave a reading of 0.000 for blank air just before defendant's reading. The machine was certified again on March 15, 2002, the same day that it was replaced because of "frequent false mouth alcohol display," which meant that the machine's mouth alcohol detector was incorrectly detecting the presence of alcohol in the mouth of a test subject and aborting the breath test.
After a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of Class 2 felony driving under the influence and Class 4 felony driving with a revoked license. He timely appeals. Pursuant to the discussion below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
II. Discussion
As a threshold matter, the State argues that defendant's issues on appeal are waived because defendant did not file a posttrial motion preserving those issues. Although a written posttrial motion is generally required to preserve an issue for appeal (People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 185-87, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988)), a posttrial motion is not necessary to preserve questions in a bench trial if the issues were presented to the trial court (People v. Crowder, 174 Ill.App.3d 939, 941, 124 Ill.Dec. 366, 529 N.E.2d 83 (1988)). Therefore, defendant has not waived his arguments in this case, and we must address the merits of his appeal.
Defendant's first argument on appeal is that the State lacked adequate grounds to stop his vehicle and thus that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered pursuant to that stop. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons and property. U.S. Const., amend. IV. Although a warrant supported by probable cause is generally required for a search or seizure to be considered reasonable under the fourth amendment, under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21- 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968), an officer may make a valid investigatory stop without probable cause when the officer reasonably infers from all the facts and circumstances that a person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. People v. Welling, 324 Ill.App.3d 594, 599-600, 258 Ill.Dec. 230, 755 N.E.2d 1049 (2001). In order to stop a vehicle, an officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle or an occupant is subject to seizure for a violation of law. People v. Greco, 336 Ill.App.3d 253, 257, 270 Ill.Dec. 626, 783 N.E.2d 201 (2003). Such reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts; a mere hunch is insufficient. Greco, 336 Ill.App.3d at 257, 270 Ill.Dec. 626, 783 N.E.2d 201; Welling, 324 Ill.App.3d at 600, 258 Ill.Dec. 230, 755 N.E.2d 1049. A court will use a totality-of-the-circumstances approach in determining whether an officer's suspicion was reasonable. People v. Ertl, 292 Ill.App.3d 863, 870, 226 Ill.Dec. 955, 686 N.E.2d 738 (1997). Only the facts known to the officer at the time of the stop can be considered in determining whether it was proper--information gained after the stop is made must be disregarded. Village of Mundelein v. Thompson, 341 Ill.App.3d 842, 848, 276 Ill.Dec. 237, 793 N.E.2d 996 (2003). We review de novo the trial court's legal determination of defendant's motion to suppress. Welling, 324 Ill.App.3d at 599, 258 Ill.Dec. 230, 755 N.E.2d 1049.
*3 While reasonable cause to stop an individual may be based on an informant's tip, some indicia of the tip's reliabili
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