People v. DiPace9/30/2004
no indication of where his informant obtained his knowledge, the Supreme Court gave great weight to the fact that the informant personally reported his tip. Adams, 407 U.S. at 147-48, 92 S.Ct. at 1923-24, 32 L.Ed.2d at 617-18. The Court stated, "[t]he informant here came forward personally to give information that was immediately verifiable at the scene." Adams, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. at 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d at 617. The Court also noted that the informant might have been subject to sanctions for making a false complaint had the investigation proved the tip incorrect. Adams, 407 U.S. at 147, 92 S.Ct. at 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d at 617. Just as in Adams, the informants here personally reported their tip to police (in addition to their phone call to the dispatcher), and the veracity of their complaint was readily ascertainable at the scene. The informants here also told the police the basis of their information about defendant, they provided their own contact information to police, and one of the witnesses even testified at trial.
Defendant argues that the trial court (and the arresting officer) found reasonable suspicion based on the combination of eyewitness testimony and the officer's observing defendant weave onto the lane dividing line. He then argues that his momentary weaving onto the lane divider was not sufficient cause for a traffic stop. However, the important question is the correctness of the trial court's ruling and not the correctness of its reasoning in reaching that result. People v. Faletti, 215 Ill.App.3d 61, 64, 158 Ill.Dec. 54, 573 N.E.2d 867 (1991). In this case, contrary to defendant's argument, we need not reach the issue of whether defendant's momentary contact with the lane marker supported stopping him, because we hold that reasonable suspicion to stop defendant existed regardless of whether the officer witnessed his weaving onto the lane marker. Therefore, the lower court was correct in finding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle. Since evidence of intoxication was properly discovered pursuant to a legal stop, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress that evidence. See Gross, 174 Ill.App.3d at 71, 123 Ill.Dec. 866, 528 N.E.2d 411 (evidence of intoxication properly discovered pursuant to a legal stop).
In making our holding, we acknowledge the recent Second District holding in Village of Mundelein v. Minx, --- Ill.App.3d ----, 287 Ill.Dec. 321, 815 N.E.2d 965 (2004). In Minx, police acted on a tip from an unnamed informant in pulling over a driver. Minx, --- Ill.App.3d at ----, 287 Ill.Dec. 321, 815 N.E.2d 965. The informant was never identified, but he was considered reliable because he exposed himself to being identified at the time police formed reasonable suspicion. Minx, --- Ill.App.3d at ----, 287 Ill.Dec. 321, 815 N.E.2d 965. However, because the informant provided only vague allegations that the defendant was "driving recklessly" without indicating what specific observations led him to that conclusion, the court found the tip itself to be unreliable. Minx, --- Ill.App.3d at ----, 287 Ill.Dec. 321, 815 N.E.2d 965. The court thus held that the police stop was unreasonable. Minx, --- Ill.App.3d at ----, 287 Ill.Dec. 321, 815 N.E.2d 965.
*5 We agree with the Minx court's determination that the tipster was reliable because he exposed himself to being identified, even though he was never later identified. The proper focus in determining whether a tip is reliable is not whether the tipster's identity was ascertained after the seizure, but whether, at the time the officer formed reasonable suspicion, the tipster was identifiable, so that he was exposed to liability for a false tip. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233-34, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2330, 76 L.Ed.2d
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