 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Fitch v. State8/31/2001
nd truthful facts, extinguishes the possibility of proving that a public official who obtained an advisory opinion acted "knowingly and willingly" in violation of the ethics law. Advisory Opinion 97-97 was directed to Robert E. Owens, Jr., Shelby County District Attorney. Fitch, thus, can claim no protection from an advisory opinion issued to the Shelby County District Attorney.
Moreover, Advisory Opinion 97-97 concerns, in part, the bid law. Fitch was found not guilty of violating 41-16-60, willfully voting to award a contract in which he had a financial interest; thus, any error in the admission of evidence regarding the award of the contract is moot.
Fitch's contention that he was denied a thorough cross-examination of Evans because the trial court refused to allow Fitch to introduce Advisory Opinion 97-97 was not preserved for appellate review; moreover, that advisory opinion was not relevant to Fitch's case.
V.
Fitch contends that the trial court erred by failing to give Fitch's written requested jury instructions concerning public funds, the advisory opinion, the competitive bid law, and theft of property.
"`A trial court has broad discretion in formulating its jury instructions, providing they are an accurate reflection of the law and facts of the case. Coon v. State, 494 So. 2d 184 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986). When requested charges are either fairly and substantially covered by the trial judge's oral charge or are confusing, misleading, ungrammatical, not predicated on a consideration of the evidence, argumentative, abstract, or a misstatement of the law, the trial judge may properly refuse to give such charges. Ex parte Wilhite, 485 So. 2d 787 (Ala. 1986).'" Hemphill v. State, 669 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995)(quoting Ward v. State, 610 So. 2d 1190, 1194 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992)(emphasis omitted)).
V-A.
Fitch argues that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to give his requested charges, no. 1 and no. 2, concerning public funds. Fitch requested the following charges.
"Defendant's Requested Jury Charge No. 1
"The words public funds distinguish the funds from moneys privately owned. Public funds are those moneys belonging to the State or to any city, county or political subdivision of the State government or the discharge of its obligations. Beckner v. Virginia, 174 Va. 454, 459, 5 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1939)." C.R. 162.
"Defendant's Requested Jury Charge No. 2
"The character of the money is determined by its ownership rather than by the manner and means of its collection. Beckner v. Virginia, 174 Va. 454, 459, 5 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1939)." C.R. 163.
Fitch contends that the question whether his alleged financial gain was derived from "public funds" was made an element of proof in several counts in this case by the wording used in the indictments, which charged that Fitch had obtained personal financial gain from "public funds." Thus, he argues he was entitled to have the jury instructed on the definition of public funds. In denying the requested charges, the trial court stated: "If that is the law, any public official with a little imagination could create a strawman, run money through that strawman, a corporation, and that would completely render this statute useless." R. 1199. We agree.
"The Alabama Legislature enacted the state ethics laws to prevent public officials from using their offices to realize private gain." Hipps v. Lauderdale County Bd. of Educ., 631 So. 2d 1023, 1027 (Ala.Civ.App. 1993). " he Ethics Act itself, in § 36-25-2, enunciates the legislative intent behind the statute. ... The tenor of the section re
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Alabama DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|