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Baker v. State8/3/2001
issible purpose for a roadblock. Thus, Edmond's "purpose inquiry" is inapplicable in this case. In fact, there is no constitutional issue in this case. Instead, this case involves purely an evidentiary issue. The majority concedes that the arresting officer on the scene testified that the purpose of the roadblock was "DUI checks" and that "his actions and the actions of the other officers on the scene were consistent with that purpose." The majority concludes, however, that there must be evidence that a supervisor's "primary purpose" for the roadblock was DUI checks. Because I disagree with this evidentiary ruling, I must respectfully dissent.
1. By combining (a) the LaFontaine v. State procedural criteria that the decision to implement a roadblock was made by supervisory personnel with (b) Edmond's requirement that the purpose of a roadblock must be constitutionally permissible, the majority extrapolates a new "constitutional prerequisite": "Edmond has elevated proof of the supervisor's `primary purpose' to a constitutional prerequisite of a lawful checkpoint." (Emphasis supplied). The flaw in the majority's analysis, however, is the failure to distinguish between different constitutional burdens (read "prerequisites") and the manner of proof by which such burdens are met.
In roadblock cases, one "constitutional prerequisite" is the State's burden to show that the roadblock was not set up so as to create an "arbitrary interference" with motorists in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The criterion in LaFontaine illustrate ways by which a State may prove procedurally that a roadblock was not set up in an arbitrary fashion:
he decision to implement the roadblock at issue in this case was made by supervisory personnel rather than by the officers in the field, and the operation was carried out pursuant to specific, pre-arranged procedures requiring all passing vehicles to be stopped at the checkpoint and leaving no discretion to the officers in this regard. It is clear that the delay experienced by passing motorists was minimal, lasting only a minute or two unless a violation was noted, and that the operation was well identified as a police checkpoint.
LaFontaine's criterion are not "constitutional prerequisites" in and of themselves. Instead, they deal with proof of roadblock procedures in order to establish lack of arbitrary interference.
Edmond, on the other hand, involves a different "constitutional prerequisite," i.e., the State's burden to show that the purpose of a roadblock seizure is constitutionally permissible. The proof by which the State demonstrates a constitutional purpose is articulated in Edmond as
we examine the available evidence to determine the primary purpose of the check point program.
This is consistent with Fourth Amendment "totality of the circumstances" review.
What the majority has done herein, however, is to select one of the LaFontaine procedural criterion that proves non-arbitrary interference, i.e., a supervisor made the decision to set up the roadblock at issue, and merge it with the Edmond "constitutional prerequisite" of permissible purpose. From this amalgamation, the majority concludes that the LaFontaine procedural criteria is a "constitutional prerequisite" which goes not to prove non-arbitrary interference, but to prove permissible purpose. I submit the springboard for that leap is nonexistent.
In fact, Edmond does not "modify" LaFontaine, as the majority asserts. The two cases have little to do with each other, except that both deal with roadblocks. Non-arbitrary interference ala the LaFontaine procedural criterion may be shown, yet a permissible purpos
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