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Banks v. State8/13/2001
Laura Ann Banks appeals the trial court's denial of her motion for discharge and acquittal on speedy trial grounds. For reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
On August 11, 1999, a Dougherty County grand jury indicted Banks on three counts arising out of a July 26, 1999 traffic accident in which a bicyclist was killed. Count one charged Banks with Homicide by Vehicle, alleging that she struck the cyclist with her vehicle while driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs to the extent that she was less safe to drive, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391. Count two charged her with driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs to the extent she was less safe to drive, and count three alleged that she failed to stop at or return to the scene of the accident. On September 21, 1999, Banks filed a motion demanding to be tried "at the current term of court or at the next succeeding regular term of court" and requesting a dismissal with prejudice should the State fail to do so.
In October 1999, Banks moved to suppress test results from a urine sample she provided while in custody. The trial court granted Banks' motion on November 4, 1999, and the State filed a Notice of Appeal that same day. Banks subsequently cross-appealed, challenging two other evidentiary rulings.
Also on November 4, 1999, the grand jury reindicted Banks. Count one of the second indictment again charged Banks with Homicide by Vehicle arising out of a violation of OCGA § 40-6-391, but alleged that she was only under the influence of alcohol. Similar to the first indictment, counts three and four charged Banks with driving under the influence of alcohol (less safe) and failing to stop at or return to the scene of the accident. In addition, count two of the second indictment contained a new Homicide by Vehicle charge, which asserted that Banks caused the cyclist's death by failing to stop at or return to the scene of the accident, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-270. After the grand jury returned this indictment, Banks did not file a new speedy trial request, electing instead to adopt her original speedy trial demand for purposes of the second indictment.
On November 12, 1999, Banks filed a motion for bond. In that motion, she specifically asked the trial court to release her on the condition that she immediately present herself to a local hospital, where her prescription medications for various illnesses could be regulated. The motion further provided:
Following hospitalization, it is the defendant's desire to enroll in an extended program of in-patient substance abuse rehabilitation, where she would remain until she has either successfully completed a program of rehabilitation or until the call of this matter for trial or hearing by the court. The specific rehabilitation facility will be chosen while defendant is hospitalized. The identity of the facility and a description of its rehabilitation program will be presented to the court for approval before the defendant is released from the hospital.
The motion also noted that Banks was and had been ready for trial under either indictment.
The trial court granted Banks' request for bond. One week later, Banks informed the court that she would be released from the hospital the following day and moved to continue her bond so that she could enroll in "an extended residential program of substance abuse rehabilitation" in Clarkston, Georgia. The motion provided that, if she finished the rehabilitation program "prior to the call of this case for trial, she [would] present herself to this court to determine whether she should remain free on bond and the conditions for continued bond." The trial court gr
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