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Brown v. State9/14/2001
Natasha Renee Brown appeals the trial court's denial of her plea in bar of procedural double jeopardy, claiming that her payment of a fine for a seat belt violation prevents the State from pursuing additional charges arising from a 1998 car accident. "`The appellate standard of review of a grant (or denial) of a double jeopardy plea in bar is whether, after reviewing the trial court's oral and written rulings as a whole, the trial court's findings support its conclusion.'" Wilson v. State.
The facts show that on July 17, 1998, Natasha Renee Brown was involved in a car accident that resulted in the death of her nine-year-old nephew. The police cited Brown for failing to secure a minor, requiring her to appear on August 20, 1998 at a hearing in the traffic division of Clayton County State Court. This hearing date was continued by agreement of counsel because the State was investigating the possibility of bringing additional charges in connection with the crash.
On July 23, 1998, the prosecutor's office informed the clerk's office not to accept payment on Davis' traffic violation because the case might involve a charge of vehicular homicide. An employee of the clerk's office attached a note to the uniform traffic citation so indicating. On September 16, 1998, Brown's traffic citation was transferred by the clerk to the solicitor general's office.
In June 1999, the clerk's office sent Brown a demand letter in connection with the court's effort to collect unpaid fines. However, this letter was sent in error. As part of its collection efforts, the clerk's office used a computer search to generate a report of cases where fines were owed. The clerk generated and sent form demand letters to the persons on the report, including Brown. However, the computer software program utilized to formulate the report had search parameters that allowed for the inclusion of individuals, such as Brown, who had other charges under investigation and had not missed their court dates. On June 8, 1999, Brown mailed a $15 money order to the court in response to the letter.
Upon receipt of the money order, the clerk accepted the payment and issued a receipt. An employee of the clerk's office temporarily coded Brown's case as a "delinquent suspended sentence" so that the computer system would accept the payment. When the clerk's office discovered that payment had been made erroneously, it designated the funds as a cash bond and updated the computer records to prevent the cash bond from being automatically forfeited. The funds were not forfeited and remain in the court's registry.
On July 6, 1999, the prosecutor filed an accusation charging Brown with improper lane change, safe operation of a vehicle required, and second degree vehicular homicide. Brown filed a plea in bar, contending that any further prosecution would be in violation of OCGA § 16-1-7 (b), which provides, in pertinent part, " f the several crimes arising from the same conduct are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution." OCGA § 16-1-7 (b).
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Brown's plea in bar, concluding that the State's case could proceed because there had been no final disposition of the seat belt charge. This appeal followed.
OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) "prevents successive prosecutions for crimes (1) arising from the same conduct, (2) known to the proper prosecuting officer, and (3) subject to jurisdiction in the same court." Wilson, supra at 456. Here, the issue to be resolved is whether it can be said that there were successive prosec
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