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Jones v. White8/23/2004
Jones' contention that our decision is controlled by this court's decision in Mohr, 324 Ill.App.3d 643, 258 Ill.Dec. 452, 756 N.E.2d 434. That case is factually distinguishable. In Mohr, the plaintiff (Mohr) was twice convicted of DUI, once in 1982 and again in 1989. Mohr, 324 Ill.App.3d at 645, 258 Ill.Dec. 452, 756 N.E.2d at 435. Following his 1989 DUI arrest, Mohr stopped drinking. In 1994 and 1999, he was evaluated and classified each time as a Level II (significant risk). Mohr, 324 Ill.App.3d at 645, 258 Ill.Dec. 452, 756 N.E.2d at 435-36. At the hearing on his April 1999 petition for reinstatement of driving privileges, Mohr submitted the 1994 and 1999 evaluations. He also testified that (1) he quit drinking because once he starts, he cannot stop; and (2) although he had never been diagnosed as an alcoholic, he believed he was one. Mohr, 324 Ill.App.3d at 645, 258 Ill.Dec. 452, 756 N.E.2d at 436. The hearing officer recommended that Mohr's petition be denied because the facts supported a Level III classification (high risk dependent), in light of Mohr's admission that he was an alcoholic and his belief that he could not return to controlled drinking in the future. The Secretary later adopted the hearing officer's findings and recommendation. Mohr, 324 Ill.App.3d at 646, 258 Ill.Dec. 452, 756 N.E.2d at 437.
*326 The circuit court reversed the Secretary's decision, and this court agreed with the circuit court. Mohr, 324 Ill.App.3d at 647-48, 258 Ill.Dec. 452, 756 N.E.2d at 437-38. In so concluding, we noted that (1) Mohr had done everything he was required to do for alcohol evaluation and complied with the Secretary's rules; and (2) Mohr's "overly critical self-analysis" did not make him a Level III risk. Mohr, 324 Ill.App.3d at 648, 258 Ill.Dec. 452, 756 N.E.2d at 438.
Unlike in Mohr, in this case, the hearing officer did not find that Jones had been misclassified as a Level II (significant risk) based only on Jones' self-analysis. Instead, the hearing officer based his finding, in part, on the existence of the prior Oregon evaluation that classified Jones as a Level III (high risk dependent), Link's failure to take into account the Oregon evaluation, Jones' diagnosis as a chemically dependent individual, and Jones' inpatient treatment for chemical dependency.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's judgment.
Reversed.
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