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People v. Ceja7/30/2004
ction 14-3(h) provides an exemption for recordings of audio when made simultaneously with a video recording. 720 ILCS 5/14-3(h) (West 2002). Because there is no video on the tape, it cannot be argued that the police simultaneously recorded the audio and video of the defendant performing field sobriety tests, as required by the statute. Therefore, the videotape in question is the equivalent of an audio recording prohibited by Illinois law and does not qualify for the section 14-3(h) exemption.
The State also argues that, even if the videotape does not qualify for the section 14-3(h) exemption, the videotape is admissible because it complies with the legislative purpose behind the statutory prohibition on recorded conversations.
Not all violations of the prohibition on recorded conversations mandate the suppression of evidence, even though we are to strictly construe the prohibition. People v. Roake, 334 Ill.App.3d 504, 268 Ill.Dec. 286, 778 N.E.2d 272 (2002). In Roake, the court observed:
"Suppression is required only where there is a failure to satisfy any of the statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the legislative intent to limit the use of eavesdropping devices. [Citation.] Where there is a failure to comply with statutory requirements, suppression depends on whether (1) the particular safeguard is central to the legislative scheme of preventing abuses; (2) the purpose the particular procedure was designed to accomplish has been satisfied despite the error; and (3) the statutory requirement was deliberately ignored and, if so, whether the **174 ***524 State gained any tactical advantage thereby. [Citation.]" Roake, 334 Ill.App.3d 504, 514, 268 Ill.Dec. 286, 778 N.E.2d 272, 280.
The video requirement in section 14-3 acts as a guarantee of an audio recording's authenticity. Because the legislature has decided that the video portion is central to the protective scheme embodied in section 14-3(h), admitting the videotape in question would frustrate *302 the legislative purpose behind the exemption. Therefore, the circuit court's suppression order was proper.
In support of its position, the State also cites People v. Ledesma, 206 Ill.2d 571, 276 Ill.Dec. 900, 795 N.E.2d 253 (2003) for the proposition that an "inadvertent error" in obtaining the evidence at issue does not operate to remove the evidence from the protection of the applicable exemption. We do not believe Ledesma to stand for this proposition.
In Ledesma, a person using a police scanner overheard a cellular phone conversation regarding an imminent drug deal. Ledesma, 206 Ill.2d 571, 276 Ill.Dec. 900, 795 N.E.2d 253. That person then relayed the information to the police, who used the tip to prevent the drug deal. Ledesma, 206 Ill.2d 571, 276 Ill.Dec. 900, 795 N.E.2d 253.
The exemption at issue in Ledesma, section 14-3(d), exempts "[r]ecording or listening with the aid of any device to any emergency communication made in the normal course of operations by any federal, state or local law enforcement agency or institutions dealing in emergency services." Ledesma, 206 Ill.2d 571, 577, 276 Ill.Dec. 900, 795 N.E.2d 253, 258, quoting 720 ILCS 5/14-3(d) (West 1998). In holding that the evidence was admissible, the court ruled that section 14-3(d) specifically exempts police scanners from the eavesdropping prohibition. The court also noted that the evidence was obtained inadvertently, but it did not set forth a broad "inadvertent error" exception to section 14-5. In fact, the court did not find that error was committed at all. We therefore find Ledesma to be inapposite.
The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
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