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Cornelison v. Commonwealth8/23/2001
serious and growing societal problem of drunk driving. In amending KRS 189A.Q10(4)(c), the Legislature was obviously concerned not only with the danger to society created by repeat DUI offenders, but also about the level of intoxication of those drivers. Cornelison argues that if the purpose of the statute was to protect the public from potential harm inflicted by drivers with an intoxication level of 0.18 or more, then all offenders whose blood alcohol content reaches such level should be subject to the increased penalties. Undisputedly, the Legislature did not impose greater sanctions for second-time offenders who are caught driving with the higher level of alcohol in their system. However, as we stated in Howard, supra, a statute does not have to be perfect to pass constitutional muster. At the time of the 1998 amendment, the Legislature evidently believed that the sanctions for second-time offenders, as well as fourth-time and subsequent offenders, were severe enough. Unquestionably, the discretion to define the level of harm and the appropriate punishment is within the purview of the Legislature, not this Court. Mullins v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 956 S.W.2d 222 (1997).
In Commonwealth v. Harrelson, Ky., 14 S.W.3d 541, 548 (2000) we stated that "[tlhe rational basis argument can be paraphrased as 'Is there a good reason to adopt a law?' The answer is a stunningly simple 'yes.' The legislature has broad discretion to determine what is harmful to the public health and welfare." There is nothing inherently unfair in treating the same class of multiple offenders differently based on their level of intoxication. Thus, we conclude that the trial court and the Court of Appeals were correct in holding that a rational basis existed for the 1998 amendment to KRS 189A.O10(4)(c).
Case No. 2000~SC-0813-TG
Appellant, Donald Decker, was indicted in July 1999, on one count of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, third offense, a class D felony, and one count of operating a motor vehicle while license is suspended or revoked for driving while under the influence, a class A misdemeanor. At the time of his arrest, Decker's blood alcohol content was over 0.18. Decker moved the Jefferson Circuit Court to declare KRS 189A.O10(4)(c) unconstitutional as an arbitrary exercise of the Commonwealth's police power. In March 2000, the trial court issued an order holding KRS 189A.O10(4)(c) unconstitutional as a violation of both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions. The Commonwealth appealed and the Court of Appeals thereafter recommended transfer to this Court.
The essential questions raised in this case regarding the constitutionality of KRS 189A.O10(4)(a) as it existed at the time of Decker's offense have been answered as it applies to Cornelison's case, to the effect that the 1998 statute was constitutional. As such, the Jefferson Circuit Court erred in holding the statute unconstitutional.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Case No. 2000-SC-0646-DG is hereby affirmed.
The order of the Jefferson District Court in Case No. 2000-SC-0813-DG is hereby vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
All concur.
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