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Kinsman v. Director of Revenue7/24/2001
to believe that Kinsman was driving. This appeal followed on June 22, 2000.
Standard of Review
According to the Director's brief, Kinsman's license was suspended under section 302.750(2). Section 302.750 is the statutory section relating to the suspension of a commercial driver's license due to the refusal to submit to a chemical blood test. However, the Director's notice of appeal and items in the legal file indicate that this is a revocation of a regular driver's license under section 577.041 for refusal of a breathalyzer. Therefore, we shall assume this was a revocation under section 577.041. In either case, the driver so affected by suspension or revocation may request a hearing before a court of record. A hearing conducted under section 577.041 is similar to a hearing conducted under section 302.750.4, which involves suspension of a commercial driver's license for refusal to submit to a breathalyzer. Pursuant to each of the two statutes, the judge is to determine whether the arresting officer had "reasonable grounds" to believe that the person was driving a motor vehicle in violation of the applicable statute, and whether the person refused to submit to the test. "Reasonable grounds" and "probable cause" are synonyms. Wilcox v. Dir. of Revenue, 842 S.W.2d 240, 254-255 (Mo. App. 1992).
In a hearing under section 577.041, "the judge shall determine only" (1) Whether or not the person was arrested or stopped; (2) whether or not the officer had "reasonable grounds . . . ;" and (3) whether the person refused the test (emphasis added). See Berry v. Dir. of Revenue, 885 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Mo. banc 1994) ("the trial court is limited to determining whether the person was arrested, whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving while intoxicated, and whether the person refused to submit to the test.") It is our duty to construe the statute in such a way as to give effect, if possible, to every word and provision. Hovis v. Daves, 14 S.W.3d 593 (Mo. banc 2000). Thus, we assume that the word "only" has some meaning and purpose. The most likely reason for the General Assembly to have used the word "only," in our view, is to make clear that the Director need not show that the officer had more than reasonable grounds (probable cause) to believe the person was driving while intoxicated. In other words, the Director need not prove, as part of making a prima facie case, that the individual in question was driving. Berry, 885 S.W.2d at 328. At the same time, in order to interpret this statute in a way that does not produce an absurd or unconstitutional result, we may assume that the word "only" refers specifically to the Director's burden. When statutes are loosely drawn, the strict meaning and arrangement of the individual words are not as persuasive as are a reasonable meaning of the words in accordance with the legislative objective. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 319 S.W.2d 559,562 (Mo. 1959). Accordingly, the revoked person is necessarily permitted to overcome the effect of the Director's initial evidence of reasonable grounds by coming forward with evidence showing that he or she was not in fact driving. If the revoked person does produce such evidence, the inquiry necessarily shifts from the issue of whether the officer had probable cause to the issue of whether the person was in fact driving. Otherwise, we would be faced with the anomalous and unjust result that someone who was not actually driving might have a revocation affirmed even after proving that he or she was not in fact driving at the time in question. We do not favor a construction that produces an absurd result. State v. Stilley, 337S.W.2d 934,939 (Mo. 1960), or an unconstitutiona
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