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Village of Mundelein v. Marcis5/14/2004
Defendant, Jeanne Marcis, was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2002)), and her driving privileges were **831 ***265 summarily suspended (see 625 ILCS 5/11- 501.1 (West 2002)). Defendant petitioned to rescind the summary suspension, arguing that she was improperly stopped. The trial court granted the petition, and the Village of Mundelein (the Village) appeals pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 303 (155 Ill.2d R. 303). See Village of Mundelein v. Thompson, 341 Ill.App.3d 842, 847, 276 Ill.Dec. 237, 793 N.E.2d 996 (2003) (a trial court's decision to grant or deny a petition to rescind a summary suspension is treated as a final order in a civil matter which is appealable under Rule 303). We reverse.
Defendant's only witness at the hearing on the petition was Officer John Sturlini of the Mundelein police department, who testified as follows. On March 8, 2003, at about 3:13 a.m., he observed defendant's vehicle ahead of him and followed it at a distance of 1 to 1 1/2 car lengths. The speed limit was 30 miles per hour. Defendant was *1011 not speeding and her car had no equipment violations. After Officer Sturlini had followed her for a quarter to a half mile, defendant stopped at a red light, signaled, and turned right. The road onto which she turned had a white fog line about 12 inches from the curb. About a quarter to a half mile after turning, her car "began to drift westbound in its lane going against the curb and at that point drove in that condition for about four car lengths before the driver drifted back into the center of the curb lane." After the vehicle had "hit, started rubbing against the curb in the curb lane," it decreased speed to 28 or 25 miles per hour. About one mile further, defendant again drifted toward the curb, rubbed her passenger side tires against the curb for about 10 car lengths, and drifted back to the center of the lane. She then slowed down to about 15 miles per hour. Defendant never drove into oncoming traffic lanes. Officer Sturlini "believed" that there was a fog line on this portion of the road as well. He decided to stop defendant based on the two drifts and reductions in speed. He admitted that he could not cite her for driving too slowly because she was not impeding traffic. Officer Sturlini subsequently arrested defendant for DUI.
When asked by defense counsel if the basis for the stop was the two drifts across the fog line, Officer Sturlini replied in the affirmative. When asked if he was sure there was a fog line, he replied, "Not a hundred percent sure. But I mean, I'm pretty sure there's a fog line there." Defendant presented a video tape showing that there were no fog lines on the road in question.
The trial court found that Officer Sturlini's testimony about defendant's initial reduction in speed was not credible. It further stated:
"And as it turns out there was no fog line that [Officer Sturlini] relied on. What that affects for the Court is the officer's basis for the stop entirely. And based upon all of the evidence that I have seen I am not convinced that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the Defendant was driving while under the influence of alcohol to make the stop in the first place.
So as to the petition to rescind it will be granted on that basis and that basis only."
The Village timely appealed.
On appeal, the Village argues that the trial court erred in granting the petition, because the stop was justified even in the absence of a fog line. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), an investigatory seizure is proper if the officer can point to specific, articulable facts which, when combined with rational inferences derived from them, provide reasonable suspicion **
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