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People v. 1995 Ford Van, VIN 1FTJE34GOSHA156035/7/2004
In this appeal, we are faced with the question of whether the civil forfeiture of a vehicle under section 36-1 of the Criminal Code of *305 1961 (720 ILCS 5/36-1 (West 2000)) is barred by the claimant's acquittal of the underlying criminal charge. We hold that the acquittal does not collaterally estop the State from pursuing the vehicle forfeiture.
The claimant, Edward Stadtler, was arrested on September 29, 2001, and charged with Class 4 felony driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (c-1)(1) (West 2000)) and driving while his license was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2000)). The claimant was charged with Class 4 felony DUI because at the time of the arrest, the claimant's driver's license was revoked for a conviction of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident involving personal injury or death. See 625 ILCS 5/11-401 (West 2000). On December 11, 2001, while the criminal charges were pending, the State filed a complaint under section 36-1 for forfeiture of the claimant's vehicle, the 1995 Ford van that is the defendant in this case. The State alleged that the van was subject to forfeiture because it had been used to commit Class 4 felony DUI.
On December 6, 2002, following a bench trial on the criminal charges, the claimant was found not guilty of DUI and guilty of driving while his license was revoked. On January 3, 2003, the claimant moved for summary judgment in the civil forfeiture proceeding. The claimant argued that because he had been acquitted of the DUI charge that formed the basis of the State's forfeiture complaint, the State was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether he had committed the crime. The trial court granted the motion, and the State timely appealed. On appeal, the State argues that the claimant's criminal acquittal of DUI does not bar the civil forfeiture proceeding against the van.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2- 1005(c) (West 2002); **813 ***247General Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lacey, 199 Ill.2d 281, 284, 263 Ill.Dec. 816, 769 N.E.2d 18 (2002). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. General Casualty Insurance Co., 199 Ill.2d at 284, 263 Ill.Dec. 816, 769 N.E.2d 18.
Section 36-1 provides that "[a]ny * * * vehicle * * * used with the knowledge and consent of the owner in the commission of * * * [Class 4 felony DUI] * * * may be seized." 720 ILCS 5/36-1 (West 2000). After the vehicle has been seized, the State may bring a forfeiture action. 720 ILCS 5/36-2 (West 2000). We note that the current version of section 36-1 allows for a vehicle seizure if, as in this case, the claimant was driving while his license was revoked for leaving *306 an accident scene. 720 ILCS 5/36-1 (West 2002); see 625 ILCS 5/6-303(g) (West 2002). However, the new provision is not applicable here because it became effective after the claimant's arrest. Thus, we consider only the DUI allegation.
The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 203 Ill.2d 497, 507, 272 Ill.Dec. 312, 787 N.E.2d 127 (2003). The best indication of that intent is the statute's language. Carver, 203 Ill.2d at 507, 272 Ill.Dec. 312, 787 N.E.2d 127. However, since section 36-1 does not mention what effect a criminal acquittal of the underlying charge would have on the forfeiture proceeding, we must look beyond the statute's language to determine the legislature's intent.
A forfeiture proceeding under section 36-1 is a civil,
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