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People v. 1995 Ford Van, VIN 1FTJE34GOSHA156035/7/2004
ciple of collateral estoppel applies in the circumstances present here." Grayson, 58 Ill.2d at 265, 319 N.E.2d 43.
The claimant argues that as in Grayson, the issue of whether he committed a crime has already been litigated and cannot be reexamined.
We believe that Grayson is distinguishable. The holding in Grayson applies to probation revocation hearings, where a defendant's liberty is at stake. In contrast, a claimant is not faced with the prospect of imprisonment in a forfeiture proceeding because the court does not examine the issue of the claimant's guilt or innocence. See One 1979 Chevrolet Camaro, 96 Ill.App.3d at 112, 51 Ill.Dec. 356, 420 N.E.2d 770. The proceeding is directed against property rather than an individual, and the court determines *309 only whether a particular item was used in the offense's commission. See One 1979 Chevrolet Camaro, 96 Ill.App.3d at 112, 51 Ill.Dec. 356, 420 N.E.2d 770. Collateral estoppel is a component of double jeopardy (People v. Milka, 336 Ill.App.3d 206, 225, 270 Ill.Dec. 476, 783 N.E.2d 51 (2003)), and civil forfeitures have not traditionally been viewed as punishment in the double jeopardy context (In re P.S., 175 Ill.2d 79, 88, 221 Ill.Dec. 853, 676 N.E.2d 656 (1997)). The legislative policy behind statutes allowing vehicle forfeitures is to repress crimes that are facilitated by vehicles; the goal is not individual punishment. See One 1979 Chevrolet Camaro, 96 Ill.App.3d at 113, 51 Ill.Dec. 356, 420 N.E.2d 770. We additionally note that the supreme court has expressed doubt about the viability of Grayson. See In re Nau, 153 Ill.2d 406, 428, 180 Ill.Dec. 240, 607 N.E.2d 134 (1992).
We conclude that the claimant's criminal acquittal of the DUI charge does not bar the State from pursuing the vehicle forfeiture. As discussed, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply because the forfeiture proceeding is a civil proceeding with a lower burden of proof than the criminal case. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 361-62, 104 S.Ct. at 1104, 79 L.Ed.2d at 368; **816 ***250One 1979 Chevrolet C-20 Van, 248 Ill.App.3d at 644, 188 Ill.Dec. 720, 618 N.E.2d 1290. We have discerned no legislative intent to have section 36-1 deviate from this generally accepted principle. Although the State was unable to meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal case, it may still prove that the vehicle was used in the commission of Class 4 felony DUI under a preponderance of the evidence standard. The Grayson exception is inapplicable because unlike a probation revocation hearing, the forfeiture proceeding is directed against the vehicle and does not put the claimant's liberty at risk. As such, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the claimant.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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