State v. Duffy7/23/2001
the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's understanding of his rights coupled with his conduct supports the trial court's ruling that he otherwise voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
The burden lies with the State to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. See State v. Torres, 130 N.H. 340, 342-43 (1988). To aid us in reviewing a trial court's determination of waiver, we have required trial courts to "enter an express finding that the waiver (and any confession) was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915 (1978). Though the State correctly points out that our ruling in Gullick did not create a substantive right to have an explicit ruling in the record, such rulings, nevertheless, help this court understand whether the trial court applied the correct standard in finding the waiver of a defendant's rights. See State v. Radziewicz, 122 N.H. 205, 211 (1982). "We will not reverse [the trial court's] finding on the issue of waiver unless the manifest weight of the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is to the contrary." State v. Dumas, 145 N.H. ___, ___, 761 A.2d 1063, 1065 (2000).
The record in this case demonstrates that the defendant indicated that he understood his rights when they were explained to him by the officer in the cruiser. Whether the defendant understands his rights and whether the defendant has waived his rights, however, are two separate matters. See Gullick, 118 N.H. at 915.
Given that there was no express waiver, we look to the defendant's course of conduct and the surrounding circumstances to determine if the defendant impliedly waived his rights. Cf. State v. Butler, 117 N.H. 888, 891 (1977) (reminding law enforcement officials of the dangers of suppression when relying upon implied waivers alone). The significant circumstances here are that the defendant was read his rights in the cruiser, taken to the police station where he was booked, required to answer questions on the ALS form, and required to decide whether to take a chemical test. Following which, he was interrogated by an officer. The defendant argues that these "intervening events" necessitated a refreshing of the Miranda warnings before interrogation.
Where a defendant first orally indicates that he understands his right to remain silent and then initiates a dialogue with the police, courts generally conclude that a knowing and voluntary waiver has occurred. See, e.g., State v. McCluskie, 611 A.2d 975, 977 (Me. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1009 (1992); State v. Aversa, 501 A.2d 370, 376 (Conn. 1985) (applying the preponderance of the evidence standard to determine if the waiver was voluntary and intelligent). This court has recognized that where there has been an express written waiver and an intervening polygraph test, the defendant's subsequent statements are admissible because "there is no per se requirement to remind him of his rights continually." State v. Monroe, 142 N.H. 857, 868 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073 (1999).
This case, however, differs from the above cases in two important respects. First, unlike in Monroe, the defendant here never expressly waived his rights, either orally or in writing. Under these circumstances, the State bears a heavier burden in demonstrating that specific conduct combined with understanding gave rise to the implication of waiver. Second, unlike in the McCluskie and Aversa cases, here the defendant did not initiate conversation, rather the police officer initiated interrogation.
Additionally, given that the defendant was requir
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