State v. Wise9/12/2001
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made:
Defendant, Brett Wise, has appealed the decision of the Cuyahoga Falls Municipal Court which denied his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Hudson City Police charged Defendant with driving while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) and failing to maintain his lane of travel, in violation of R.C. 4511.25(A). Defendant appealed his administrative license suspension and moved to suppress all evidence resulting from the stop of his vehicle. The trial court denied the motion and the appeal. The court dismissed the charge for failing to maintain lane of travel and Defendant pled no contest to the remaining charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol. The trial court sentenced him accordingly. Defendant timely appealed raising one assignment of error for review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in overruling [Defendant's] motion to suppress and ALS appeal finding that the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the stop of [Defendant's] vehicle.
In his assignment of error, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, Defendant contends that the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was weaving in his lane in violation of Hudson Codified Ordinance 432.38 to justify the stop. We disagree.
An appellate court's standard of review with respect to a motion to suppress is whether the trial court's findings are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Winand (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 286, 288, citing Tallmadge v. McCoy (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 604, 608. "In a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses." State v. Hopfer (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 548, quoting State v. Venham (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 653. However, once accepting those facts as true, the appellate court must independently determine, as a matter of law and without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether the trial court met the applicable legal standard. State v. Guysinger (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 592, 594.
Law enforcement officers may perform a warrantless investigative stop of a vehicle if it is supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in criminal activity or is operating his vehicle in violation of the law. See Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 27, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 909; Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 663, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 673. The United States Supreme Court has held that a traffic stop is lawful, regardless of an officer's motives in stopping a vehicle, so long as a reasonable officer could stop the vehicle for a traffic violation. Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806, 809, 813, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95, 98.
As we stated in State v. Flanagan (June 14, 2000), Wayne App. No. 99CA0045, unreported, at 4, appellate review of whether a particular investigatory stop was reasonable or not, is a two part review. Ornelas v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 690, 696, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 919. The first is a factual review of the events leading up to the stop. Id. Once the historical facts are determined, the second inquiry is whether the "historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion." Id. This inquiry is a mixed question of fact and law. Id. The Supreme Court has held th
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