State v. Hill7/5/2001
be more impersonal. But that's the reason for that."
Appellee argues that the use of an anonymous jury violated his rights to the presumption of innocence, to a trial by jury, to a public trial, and to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. See Section 2, Article III, United States Constitution ("Trial of all Crimes * * * shall be by Jury"); Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ("accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial"); Section 5, Article I, Ohio Constitution ("right of trial by jury shall be inviolate"); Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution ("party accused shall be allowed * * * a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed").
Because appellee did not object to the use of an anonymous jury, or raise any issue regarding juror anonymity at trial, our precedents require us to ask whether plain error occurred in this situation. Normally, an appellate court need not consider an error that was not called to the attention of the trial court at a time when the error could have been avoided or corrected by the trial court. State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 117, 5 O.O.3d 98, 101, 364 N.E.2d 1364, 1367. Accordingly, a claim of error in such a situation is usually deemed to be waived absent plain error. See Crim.R. 52(B). "Notice of plain error * * * is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice." State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph three of the syllabus.
B.
The court of appeals found that it was not limited to applying a plain-error analysis to the anonymous jury situation at issue in this case. Instead, the court of appeals determined that this was a situation to be reviewed under the doctrine of "structural error."
In Neder v. United States (1999), 527 U.S. 1, 7-9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 144 L.Ed.2d 35, 45-47, the United States Supreme Court recently summarized the essentials of its jurisprudence regarding structural error:
"Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs direct appeals from judgments of conviction in the federal system, provides that ` ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.' Although this Rule by its terms applies to all errors where a proper objection is made at trial, we have recognized a limited class of fundamental constitutional errors that `defy analysis by "harmless error" standards.' Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 [111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331] (1991); see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 23 [87 S.Ct. 824, 827-828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710] (1967). Errors of this type are so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal (i.e., `affect substantial rights') without regard to their effect on the outcome. For all other constitutional errors, reviewing courts must apply Rule 52(a)'s harmless-error analysis and must `disregar ' errors that are harmless `beyond a reasonable doubt.' Id., at 24 [87 S.Ct. at 828, 17 L.Ed.2d at 711].
" * * *
"We have recognized that `most constitutional errors can be harmless.' Fulminante, supra, at 306 [111 S.Ct. at 1263, 113 L.Ed.2d at 329]. ` f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other constitutiona errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis.' Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 [106 S.Ct. 3101, 3106, 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 471] (1986). Indeed, we have found an error to be `structural,' and thus subject to automatic reversal, only in a
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