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Mogard v. City of Laramie9/24/2001
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"The implied Consent Law was not designed to give greater rights to a suspected drunken driver than were constitutionally afforded before its passage. Its purpose was intended to impose a condition on the right to operate a motor vehicle on the streets and highways of this state. The condition requires that a driver, by so operating a vehicle in Wyoming, consents to submit to chemical tests for intoxication under statutorily determined circ mstances. The refusal to submit to a test can result in revocation of a driver's license. It was intended to facilitate the tests for intoxication and not to inhibit the ability of the state to remove drunken drivers from the highways of our state. In light of this purpose, it must be liberally construed to effectuate its policies." State v. Marquez, 638 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Wyo. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Chastain, 594 P.2d at 461).
The policy considerations behind the implied consent statutes would seem to mitigate against finding a particular state need or desire to enlarge the right to counsel in this context.
WYO. CONST. ART. 1, § 10 CASES
[ ] The right to counsel is only one of many protections afforded by both the United States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution. Over the years, this Court has been called upon many times to analyze different rights under both constitutions. The result has not exactly been a seamless web of constitutional analysis. A few examples may suffice. In State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1129 (Wyo. 1993), where the issue was double jeopardy in the context of a requested lesser included offense instruction, we stated that Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11 "assures the same protection as" the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In adopting the statutory elements test for lesser included offenses, we then followed United States Supreme Court guidance. Two years later, however, in analyzing a defendant's right not to incriminate himself under the same state constitutional provision and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we noted the "broader protections" of our state constitution and reiterated our abandonment of the federal due process analysis in "comment-upon-silence" cases. Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 389-90 (Wyo. 1995) (citing Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1978), overruled on other grounds by Richter v. State, 642 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1982)).
[ ] In two cases in 1999, this Court recognized some difficulties in applying the Saldana factors in Wyoming. In Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 483-84, we stated:
Those courts independently analyzing their state constitutions to determine the permissible scope of an automobile search incident to the arrest of its driver or passengers usually have either a long tradition of such independent analysis or have sufficient constitutional history to permit departing from federal precedent through principled reasoning.
In the case of Wyoming's search and seizure provision, there is little constitutional history available to provide clues as to the framers' intent when drafting it. Further hampering our analysis is the fact that this Court both initiated and then all but abandoned independent analysis of the state constitutional provision during the 1920s and 1930s and began determining search and seizure issues under the Fourth Amendment with strict adherence to United States Supreme Court decisions.
Despite the disclaimer, this Court concluded that the "national citizenry rationale" of federal precedent did not fit Wyoming, adopting instead a "narrower application" of the automobile search incident to arrest doctrine. Vasquez, 990 P.2d at
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