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Dawson v. State2/14/2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
[No. 4354 - February 14, 2001]
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Elaine M. Andrews, Judge.
On April 19, 1997, Carlos Dawson twice sold cocaine to Grace Comegys. Unbeknownst to Dawson, Comegys was working as an informant for the Anchorage Police Department. Comegys turned the cocaine over to the police, and Dawson was indicted and ultimately convicted of third-degree controlled substance misconduct (sale of cocaine).
In this appeal, Dawson contends that the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to peremptorily challenge a prospective juror based solely on the juror's race. He also contends that the trial court violated his right to disclosure of government evidence. Finally, Dawson contends that the trial court improperly prohibited his attorney from cross-examining a government witness regarding two of her past arrests. For the reasons explained here, we reject Dawson's contentions and affirm his convictions.
Dawson's Batson objection to the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of a black prospective juror
During the selection of Dawson's jury, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against a black prospective juror. Dawson is also black. Dawson's attorney objected to the prosecutor's action, contending that the prosecutor had challenged the prospective juror based on racial prejudice. (Such challenges violate the Constitution. See Batson v. Kentucky. )
Responding to the defense attorney's objection, the prosecutor told the court that he had challenged the prospective juror for two reasons. First, the juror had described a prior incident in California in which he and some other black men were pulled over by the police for no good reason. The juror stated that he believed the California officers were motivated by racial animosity (although he added that he had never encountered similar problems with the police in Alaska). The prosecutor explained that he feared that the juror might still harbor resentment from that incident. Second, the juror expressed the view that undercover operations are better conducted by police officers rather than paid informants (although he stated that he understood why it was sometimes necessary to use informants). The prosecutor told the court that, because the State's case rested in large measure on the testimony of an informant (Comegys), he feared that this prospective juror would be unduly skeptical of the State's case.
After hearing the prosecutor's explanation, Superior Court Judge Elaine M. Andrews denied the defense attorney's Batson objection. She found that the prosecutor had presented credible race-neutral reasons to justify the peremptory challenge.
On appeal, Dawson asserts that the prosecutor's purported reasons for challenging the black juror were simply a subterfuge to mask the prosecutor's racial prejudice. Dawson argues that, when the juror's answers are evaluated as a whole, those answers provide no basis for concluding that the juror could not be fair.
We assume that the prospective juror could have decided the case fairly. But the question is not whether the prospective juror should have been disqualified for cause. Rather, the question is whether the prosecutor offered a credible race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge.
The whole point of peremptory challenges is to allow attorneys to strike prospective jurors for reasons that would not justify a challenge for cause. Through the use of peremptory challenges, an attorney can strike prospective jurors who may not be receptive to the attorney's case, the attorney's client, o
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