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Pitka v. State3/16/2001
No. 1728
This case raises an issue concerning the proper application of Criminal Rule 45(c)(1). This rule governs calculation of the time for bringing a defendant to trial on additional charges that are filed after the initial complaint or indictment. The rule states that the same Rule 45 calculation governs all charges arising out of the "same criminal episode" unless the later charges are based on newly-discovered evidence.
Pitka was initially charged with two crimes, and then later indicted for a third. He argues that, even though the third charge was filed many months later, the speedy trial clock started running for this third charge on the same day that the initial two charges were filed - meaning that the time for bringing Pitka to trial on this third charge had already expired by the time it was filed. For the reasons explained here, we conclude that the third charge was not part of the same criminal episode as the initial two charges, and thus the third charge was governed by its own separate Rule 45 calculation.
Pitka also raises a sentencing issue: he contends that the superior court committed error when it found that the State had proved an aggravating factor. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the superior court was not clearly erroneous in finding this aggravator.
The Rule 45 issue
On December 13, 1998, State Trooper Dane Gilmore was dispatched to a reported domestic disturbance in a Fairbanks apartment. Gilmore found a man and a woman in the apartment. The woman, Alexa Crow, told Gilmore that the man - the Appellant, Michael R. Pitka - had come to the apartment in violation of a restraining order. Crow said that when she directed Pitka to leave, Pitka overturned the kitchen table, causing damage of about $100. Upon receiving this information, Gilmore arrested Pitka for the offenses of criminal trespass and criminal mischief.
When Gilmore arrested Pitka, he searched the inside pocket of Pitka's vest and found a baggie containing a little less than one ounce of white powder. A field test of this powder indicated that it was cocaine. Three months later, on March 22, 1999, the State Crime Lab reported that this substance was indeed 21.1 grams of cocaine.
On the day following Pitka's arrest (i.e., on December 14, 1998), the State filed a complaint charging Pitka with criminal trespass and criminal mischief. However, the State did not indict Pitka for possession of cocaine (third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance) until half a year later, on July 14, 1999.
Criminal Rule 45(c)(1) states that the time for bringing a defendant to trial begins to run "from the date the charging document is served upon the defendant". Thus, with regard to Pitka's charges of criminal trespass and criminal mischief, Rule 45 commenced running on December 14, 1998. The question presented in this appeal is whether Rule 45 also commenced running on December 14th with respect to the yet- to-be-filed possession of cocaine charge. The answer to this question turns on the proper application of Criminal Rule 45(c)(3).
Criminal Rule 45(c)(3) deals with the issue of later-filed charges. The first sentence of this subsection states:
New Charges. The Rule 45 commencement date for a new charge arising out of the same criminal episode shall be the same as the commencement date for the original charge, unless the evidence on which the new charge is based was not available to the prosecution on the commencement date for the original charge.
Under this rule, calculation of the Rule 45 commencement date for Pitka's cocaine charge hinges on whether that coca
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