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Smith v. United States3/8/2001
Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Criminal Division
(Hon. Robert E. Morin, Trial Judge)
Submitted February 1, 2001
After a bench trial appellant, Bruce Smith was convicted of simple assault in violation of D.C. Code § 22-504. Appellant contends that because D.C. Code § 1-617.1(d)(1) repealed by Omnibus Consolidated Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, § 134, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-596, 45 D.C. Reg. 9049 (making effective D.C. Law 12- 124, the Omnibus Personal Reform Amendment of 1998, §§ 101(c) & 401) provided that uniformed members of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) may be terminated for cause for committing either a felony or a misdemeanor, he had a constitutional right to a trial by jury because the possibility that he might lose his job converted the petty crime of simple assault into a serious crime. We disagree and affirm.
I. FACTUAL SUMMARY
The evidence at trial showed that on November 19, 1997, appellant, then an officer employed by the MPD, illegally stopped six young men who were standing on a public street. He ordered the men up against his unmarked police car, and patted them down. Appellant then ordered one of the young men, Paul Watkins, to come back and pick up a tissue someone had left on the car. When Mr. Watkins refused, Officer Smith roughly grabbed him, dragged him to the car and forced him to pick up the tissue. After the two exchanged some words, Officer Smith punched Mr. Watkins in the face.
Appellant was charged with assault under D.C. Code § 22-504 (a), which authorizes a maximum penalty of 180 days imprisonment, a $1000 fine, or both. See D.C. Code § 22-504 (a) (2000 Supp.). Subsequently, appellant received a Notice of Proposed Adverse Action from the MPD, charging appellant with misconduct as defined in D.C. Code § 1-617.1 (d)(1) and (16), and proposing termination of employment following an administrative hearing, if Smith so requested. Appellant then demanded a jury trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989), arguing that D.C. Code § 1-617.1 (d), by providing for termination for cause, elevated simple assault to serious crime status, and thus warranted a jury trial. This motion was denied and, after a bench trial, appellant was convicted of simple assault in violation of D.C. Code § 22-504. Appellant did not request an administrative hearing and, instead, resigned from the police force.
II. ANALYSIS
We review the denial of a defendant's request for a jury trial de novo. See Day v. United States, 682 A.2d 1125, 1127 (D.C. 1996) (holding that defendant was not entitled to a jury trial for simple assault); Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 35 (D.C. 1989) (en banc) (Court of Appeals reviews pure legal determinations de novo based on an original appraisal of the record).
Appellant contends that because D.C. Code § 1-617.1 (1992 Repl.) provided that uniformed members of the MPD may be terminated for cause for committing either a felony or a misdemeanor, the statute converted the otherwise "petty" crime of simple assault into a "serious crime," thereby giving rise to a right to a trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment. Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for a trial by jury because appellant "risked his career, medical benefits, and retirement upon conviction," and was subjected to penalties "well beyond the punishment prescribed by Section 22-504." Appellant's argument centers upon whether his potential termination from employment under D.C. Code § 1-617.1, when viewed together with a
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