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Smith v. United States3/8/2001
's presumption that offenses carrying no more than six months incarceration are petty.
Appellant has cited no authority in this jurisdiction for the proposition that potential termination or employer discipline upon conviction enhances simple assault to a "serious" crime, nor does he explain how his case differs from Foote. As in Foote, the termination in his case did not follow automatically upon conviction of assault, but was based on the MPD's assessment that the underlying conduct "would affect adversely the employee 's or the agency's ability to perform effectively," D.C. Code § 1-617-1 (d)(16) & (22) (1992 Repl.), and bring "discredit upon [appellant] or the department," General Order Series 201, Number 26, Part I-B-22. The MPD notice and proposed termination recited the specific misconduct of which appellant was accused.
Such adverse action for cause could be imposed only after certain procedural requirements were satisfied, in proceedings outside the province of the sentencing court, and are discretionary. See Foote, 670 A.2d at 372 (" e conclude that, to the extent that the purported penalties of which Foote complains could not be imposed by the sentencing judge as punishment for the two charged offenses, Foote's reliance on such uncertain and purely collateral consequences of his conviction must fail." (footnote omitted)). Therefore, we have no difficulty concluding that the legislature did not intend that potential termination under D.C. Code § 1-617.1 elevate a petty crime such as simple assault to a jury-demandable offense and hold that appellant was not entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment.
Affirmed.
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