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Bagwell v. State3/28/2001
n admitting the breath test results.
2. Bagwell next complains that the admission of evidence of his two prior DUIs as similar transactions was an error of constitutional magnitude. He asserts that the trial court allowed the state to establish the similarity of the prior offenses by introducing a certified copy of each disposition. This is incorrect.
The circumstances surrounding the commission of each prior offense were established by the testimony of the respective arresting officer. Accordingly, this case differs from Stephens v. State, in which the state offered no evidence of the commission of the prior crime other than the certified copy of the conviction. Further, as Bagwell had entered a plea of nolo contendere to the first offense, the trial court properly ruled that the state could not introduce evidence concerning the criminal disposition of that offense. Finally, the court correctly determined that the state met its burden of proving the similarity of the offenses. On the first two occasions, Bagwell was stopped late at night in Gwinnett County for failure to maintain lane. In this instance, he was observed driving erratically. On all three occasions, he was arrested based on his performance on field sobriety tests. In any event,
vidence of a prior DUI offense, regardless of the circumstances surrounding its commission, is logically connected with a pending DUI charge as it is relevant to establish that the defendant has the bent of mind to get behind the wheel of a vehicle when it is less safe for him to do so.
The decision to admit prior similar transaction evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent abuse. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.
3. Finally, Bagwell contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict on the per se charge. Bagwell moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that the evidence showed that the Intoxilyzer 5000 had a margin of error of 0.01 grams. Thus, he argued, the evidence was consistent with a finding that his blood alcohol concentration was 0.098. However, we have repeatedly held that an Intoxilyzer's margin of error relates to the weight given to the test results rather than to their admissibility. We have also held that the results are direct evidence of guilt.
On appeal the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict, and [Bagwell] no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence; moreover, an appellate court determines evidence sufficiency and does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. The standard for reviewing a denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is whether under the rule of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.
The properly admitted Intoxilyzer results provided ample evidence of Bagwell's guilt of the per se charge. It follows that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.
Judgment affirmed.
Blackburn, C. J., and Pope, P. J., concur.
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