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City of Anderson v. Davis2/21/2001
egligence claims for lack of a federal issue. The court contemporaneously issued its Order of Judgment, stating Davis's excessive force claims were dismissed with prejudice, and that this determination constituted a final judgment. There is no indication in the record that Davis appealed this judgment.
On May 29, 1998, Davis filed another Complaint in the Madison County Superior Court against the same defendants, this time raising only negligence claims. The defendants denied Davis's allegations, and asserted the affirmative defense of governmental immunity under the ITCA. They also contended that any excessive force claims implicated in the complaint were barred pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on their immunity claim on July 21, 1998. On September 9, 1998, venue was transferred to the Hancock County Superior Court. The court denied the City's summary judgment motion on June 11, 1999. On June 22, 1999, the defendants moved to dismiss Davis's complaint on the ground that Davis was injured by the actions of a co-employee, and that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the exclusivity provision in the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act. The court had not ruled on this motion by the time the matter proceeded to bench trial on June 29 and 30, 1999.
The trial court issued its Judgment Order, as well as findings of fact and conclusions of law, on January 4, 2000. The court rejected the defendants's jurisdictional challenge, dismissed Chief Rheam for lack of evidence of his liability, and concluded that the use of Chester under the circumstances was negligent. The court also again concluded that the defendants were not immune under the ITCA, and entered judgment in favor of Davis in the amount of $200,000. The City now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
A. Standard of Review
While the issue of a governmental entity's immunity from liability under the ITCA may require extended factual development, the issue remains a question of law for the courts. Minks v. Pina, 709 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We therefore review claims of governmental immunity de novo. Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Indiana Department of Natural Resources, 720 N.E.2d 424, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh'g denied. We owe the trial court no deference, and we will substitute our judgment for that of the trial court if necessary. Pedrazza ex rel. Pedrazza v. Grande, 712 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
B. Analysis
The City claims that it was immune from liability for officer Stoops's alleged negligence pursuant to the "law enforcement immunity" provision of the ITCA. Davis contends that the City is not immune because the use of Chester under the circumstances did not constitute the "enforcement of a law" within the meaning of the Act. Our analysis of these competing claims requires a brief review of the confusing and perpetually fluctuating status of the immunity granted to law enforcement personnel under the ITCA.
1. Law Enforcement Immunity Under the ITCA
In Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733, 737 (1971), the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that governmental entities in Indiana owe a common law duty to use ordinary and reasonable care under the circumstances, and have no common law immunity for breaches of this duty except in cases involving the failure to provide adequate police protection to prevent crime, the appointment of an incompetent official, and erroneous judicial decision making. The Indiana General Assembly subsequently enacted the ITCA, currently codified at Indiana Code sections 34-13-3-1 to -25, expanding t
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