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City of Anderson v. Davis2/21/2001
he immunity of governmental entities to certain cases where a common law duty of care otherwise exists. See Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3. Among those areas of governmental activity exempted by the ITCA from liability are certain law enforcement activities. Section 3(7) of the ITCA, in its current form, provides: A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from:
the adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law (including rules and regulations), unless the enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(7).
The Indiana Supreme Court originally interpreted this provision to mean that government entities would be immune under the ITCA for "all acts of enforcement save false arrest and imprisonment." Seymour National Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Ind. 1981), clarified on rehearing, 428 N.E.2d 203. The supreme court subsequently disavowed Seymour's broad view of law enforcement immunity under the ITCA on the ground that Seymour's interpretation was inconsistent with the intent of the legislature. Tittle v. Mahan, 582 N.E.2d 796, 800 (Ind. 1991). In Tittle, the court explained that by enacting the ITCA's law enforcement immunity provision, the legislature intended to include "only those activities attendant to effecting the arrest of those who may have broken the law." Id. at 801. For other actions taken by law enforcement officers, government entities would be subject to liability to the extent allowable at common law. Id.
The supreme court revisited the issue and overruled Tittle two years later in Quackenbush v. Lackey, 622 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. 1993). In Quackenbush, the supreme court expanded its definition of "law enforcement" beyond the bounds set by Tittle, explaining that its conclusion in Tittle regarding the legislature's intent to immunize only actual attempts to effect arrests had produced an unworkable rule of law, and was, after further reflection, analytically unsound. Id. at 1287. The court stated that "the scope of the phrase `adoption or enforcement of a law' . . . is not limited to traditional law enforcement activities such as the arrest or pursuit of suspects by police. Rather, in its broader (and correct) meaning, Section 3(7) applies to the decision of any governmental entity and its employees about whether to adopt or enforce any statute, rule, or regulation." Id. at n.3. Although Quackenbush expanded the meaning of "law enforcement" under the ITCA,the court circumscribed the availability of immunity for such enforcement. The majority in Quackenbush decided that, by enacting the law enforcement immunity provision of the ITCA, the legislature actually intended to "codify the common law as it existed at the time the Act was passed." Id. at 1290-1291. The court explained that when the ITCA was enacted, " he state of the common law was such that governments and their employees were subject to liability for the breach of private duties owed to individuals, but were immune from liability for the breach of public duties owed to the public at large." Id. at 1291. Thus, under Quackenbush, governmental entities would be immune from liability for losses stemming from law enforcement activities that breached public duties, but not for losses resulting from the violation of private duties. The court went on to determine that the negligent operation of a police car involved the breach of a private duty, and that the officer in question was not immune from liability. Id.
The supreme court's recent decision in Benton v. City of Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1999) nullified much of Quackenbush. In Benton, the court jettisoned Quackenbush's
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