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City of Anderson v. Davis2/21/2001
law. Minks, 709 N.E.2d at 382-383 (holding that police officers who instructed an intoxicated and unlicensed teenager, who was a passenger in a vehicle operated by his intoxicated relative, to drive the vehicle home rather than go through the effort of preparing arrest paperwork for the two intoxicated subjects, were immune from liability for damages resulting from deaths of two innocent motorists, and injuries to another, cause by the drunk driving relative).
Here, the City deployed Chester to assist in locating and apprehending an individual who had escaped from a juvenile detention facility, where he was being held on charges of auto theft, and who was evading recapture by the police. The City's use of Chester under the circumstances plainly constituted an "activit in which a government entity or its employees compel or attempt to compel the obedience of another to laws, rules or regulations, or sanction or attempt to sanction a violation thereof," and therefore amounted to the "enforcement of a law" within the meaning of the ITCA.
Finally, we note that a portion of Davis's brief may be construed to suggest that, regardless of whether Officer Stoops was enforcing a law in the scope of his employment, the City is not entitled to immunity because Officer Stoops's use of Chester to apprehend the fleeing subject under the circumstances amounted to an unconstitutional use of excessive force. It is unclear if a police officer enforcing the law in the scope of his employment would be exempt from immunity under the ITCA if his actions amounted to excessive force, or were illegal in some other way.
However, we need not determine this question here because, as the City notes, the legality of the City's use of force was an issue resolved against Davis in the prior federal court action, and Davis was collaterally estopped from raising it again in his state case. The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars the re-litigation in a subsequent action of a fact or issue adjudicated in a prior lawsuit. Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962, 968 (Ind. 1998). The former adjudication will be conclusive in the subsequent action even if the two actions are on different claims. Sullivan v. American Cas. Co., 605 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Ind. 1992). When determining whether a party is collaterally estopped from litigating an issue, a court must consider whether the party against whom the judgment is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances to permit estoppel. Id. at 138.
Davis pursued his excessive force claims in the United States District Court. The federal court entered summary judgment against Davis on these claims, a final judgment from which Davis apparently took no appeal. Davis conceded in the trial court that his excessive force claims were rejected by the federal court, and he presents no argument upon appeal that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his excessive force claim in the prior action, or that application of collateral estoppel would be otherwise unfair. Thus, the federal court's judgment dismissing Davis's excessive force claims must be given preclusive effect here, and to the extent Davis argues that the City is not entitled to law enforcement immunity because its use of Chester amounted to an illegal use of excessive force, that argument would fail. In sum, because Davis's damages resulted from officer Stoops's deployment of Chester, which constituted the enforcement of law in the scope of his employment, the City is immune from liability pursuant to the ITCA.
Reversed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and MATTINGLY, J., concur.
The City also ch
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