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St. Pierre v. Director of Revenue3/21/2001
ularly instructive here is the Sullins case. There a Houston, Missouri, policeman pursued a driver via high speed chase to a point outside the Houston city limits. At that point, the driver wrecked his car, and the officer arrested him. The driver refused to take the chemical test; consequently, Director revoked his license per section 577.041. The circuit court, upon review of Director's decision, reversed the revocation after finding the arrest was invalid because it was effected by a municipal officer outside the city limits. We reversed, holding the validity of the arrest was irrelevant in the section 577.041 license revocation proceeding because the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil proceedings. Sullins, 893 S.W.2d at 850.
St. Pierre argues Sullins does not control because the fresh pursuit law was not an issue in that case. Such argument is answered by the Sterneker case. There, a Gallatin, Missouri, policeman arrested a driver three miles beyond the city limits. After the driver was arrested, his blood alcohol content was measured at 0.173 percent, and Director revoked his license under section 302.505. Upon appeal, the circuit court reversed, finding there was no proof the arresting officer had "fresh pursuit" authority because no evidence was adduced that Gallatin had adopted a "fresh pursuit" policy as mandated by section 544.157.4. Sterneker, 3 S.W.2d at 809 n.3. The western district reversed, and held: "Because this is not a criminal case, but an administrative law or civil case, the circuit court erred in imposing a criminal procedure statute, section 544.157, on the strictures mandated by the General Assembly for a case involving a driving license." Id. at 810 (citing Jennings, 992 S.W.2d 249). Continuing, the Sterneker court observed, " ere we to add to section 302.510 the requirements which the circuit court imposed [compliance with section 544.157.4(4)], we would, in effect, be rewriting the statute. Because revocation of a driving license is a matter solely of statutory creation, the courts must follow the method provided by the General Assembly in Chapter 302, if it is adequate." Id. at 811.
Based on Riche, Sterneker, Jennings, and Sullins, we conclude that even if Linn Creek had no fresh pursuit policy and its absence resulted in an illegal arrest--a finding we need not and do not make--all evidence collected as a result of the pursuit, stop, and arrest was still not excludable via the exclusionary rule. To require proof that Linn Creek had such a policy would in effect be a rewriting of section 577.041, which is not the function of this court. The cases mentioned amply support our determination that in a proceeding under section 577.041, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable regardless of the requirements of section 544.157. The trial court erred by finding Director here failed to meet his burden of proof. Substantial evidence in the record shows: (1) St. Pierre was arrested, (2) the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe St Pierre was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition, and (3) St. Pierre refused to submit to the test.
We are authorized to enter the judgment the trial court should have entered. Rule 84.14; Sullins, 893 S.W.2d at 850. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. The Director's revocation of St. Pierre's driving privileges is reinstated.
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