State v. Tucker1/24/2001
Strafford
The defendant, Paul Tucker, was convicted of bribery, see RSA 640:2 (1996), after the Superior Court (Mohl, J.) denied the defendant's motion to suppress a custodial statement. The issue on appeal is whether a custodial statement, made during questioning without the benefit of Miranda warnings, offering a bribe to a police officer is admissible to support a bribery conviction. We affirm.
The following facts were adduced at the suppression hearing. The defendant, with a blood alcohol level of .30, was taken into protective custody after disrupting the emergency room at Frisbie Memorial Hospital at 1:30 a.m. on March 25, 1997. The defendant struggled with the police officer at the hospital and was arrested for resisting detention and assault. In the course of booking the defendant, the police officer made inquiries about the defendant's Massachusetts probation status.
The same police officer transported the defendant to an early morning arraignment approximately six to seven hours after his arrest. While waiting for the arraignment to begin, the police officer repeated some of his earlier questioning regarding the defendant's probation. The officer testified that he wanted to verify this information because of the defendant's earlier high level of intoxication and the need for accurate information to determine bail, if any, at the arraignment. Following three questions about his probation, the defendant offered the police officer "$500 to let him go." At no time prior to arraignment was the defendant informed of his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 479 (1966).
In the context of a prosecution for bribery, the defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statement offering a bribe because the statement was the product of custodial interrogation absent Miranda warnings. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990); State v. Grant-Chase, 140 N.H. 264, 268, 665 A.2d 380, 383, cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1140 (1995). The trial court concluded that the "bribery statement was a spontaneous response to routine booking questions, and not the product of interrogation."
"We analyze the defendant's constitutional claims first under the New Hampshire Constitution, referencing decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions only for the purpose of aiding our State constitutional analysis." State v. Marti, 143 N.H. 608, 611, 732 A.2d 414, 417 (1999) (quotation, brackets, and ellipsis omitted). Because Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides at least the same level of protection for a defendant making a custodial statement as the United States Constitution, see State v. Jaroma, 137 N.H. 143, 149, 625 A.2d 1049, 1052-53 (1993); State v. Goding, 128 N.H. 267, 273-74, 513 A.2d 325, 330 (1986), we do not engage in a separate federal analysis, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 232, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (1983). We rely on factual findings made by the trial court that are not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and that are sufficient to support the trial court's rulings when reviewing issues related to custodial interrogation. See State v. Guajardo, 135 N.H. 401, 404, 605 A.2d 217, 219 (1992).
The State argues that the offer of a bribe was an independent crime not subject to the protection afforded by Miranda, see United States v. Castro, 723 F.2d 1527, 1530-31 (11th Cir. 1984), and that even if the trial court's Miranda analysis was incorrect, we should affirm the court's ruling, see State v. Coppola, 130 N.H. 148, 153, 536 A.2d 1236, 1239-40 (1987) (affirming based on alternative grounds for admission of statement), rev'd on other gr
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