 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Henderson3/7/2001
pellants] can't have a fair trial before the same jury."
As support for their argument on this issue, Appellants have cited a few federal court cases in which separate juries were used. However, Appellants have failed to cite any authority that would require separate juries in a case such as this one. Indeed, the general rule is that the decision of whether to grant a motion for severance is within the discretion of the trial court and the trial court's decision will not be reversed absent a showing of prejudice. See State v. Robinson, 971 S.W.2d 30, 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Ensley, 956 S.W.2d 502, 508 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). In this case, Appellants have failed to meet their burden of showing that the trial court abused its discretion. In fact, Appellants have failed to identify a single instance in which one Appellant was prejudiced by the introduction of evidence that was only admissible against the other Appellant. In addition, Appellants have failed to identify any other way in which the trial court's denial of their motion prevented them from having a fair trial. This issue has no merit.
III. SEPARATE JURIES DURING THE GUILT AND SENTENCING PHASES
Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it denied their motion for separate juries during the guilt and sentencing phases of trial. We disagree.
First, Appellants contend that having the same jury during the guilt and sentencing phases is unconstitutional because it deprived them of their right to a fair trial. Specifically, Appellants contend that the current system is unfair because the State's ability to challenge jurors that have personal views against the death penalty leads to a system where the jury is more likely to convict. However, the Tennessee Supreme Court has previously considered and rejected this argument. See State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 318-319 (Tenn. 1986) (rejecting the argument that a defendant is entitled to separate juries during the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial in order to guarantee a fair trial by a jury that represented a cross section of the community); State v. Zagorski, 701 S.W.2d 808, 814-15 (Tenn. 1985) (rejecting the argument that a defendant is entitled to separate juries during the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial on the theory that a "death qualified" jury is skewed toward a finding of guilt in contravention of the right to a fair and impartial jury composed of a cross-section of the community); see also State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679, 717 (Tenn. 1997) (rejecting the argument that the manner of selecting "death qualified" jurors results in juries that are prone to conviction); State v. Teel, 793 S.W.2d 236, 246 (Tenn. 1990) (rejecting the argument that the process of "death qualifying" prospective jurors produces a jury that is biased in favor of the State on the issue of guilt or innocence and is not fairly representative of the community).
Second, Appellants contend that having the same jury during the guilt and sentencing phases is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury. Essentially, Appellants contend that it is impossible for a jury that has convicted a defendant of first-degree murder to be impartial when it decides whether to impose a death sentence on that defendant. However, Appellants have failed to cite any authority or anything in the record in support of this proposition. We cannot agree that the mere fact that a jury has convicted a defendant of first degree murder automatically renders that jury incapable of impartially deciding whether to impose a death sentence. This issue has no merit.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENA
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 Tennessee DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|