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State v. Henderson3/7/2001
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Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it limited the amount of questions that could be asked during voir dire. We disagree.
"The ultimate goal of voir dire is to insure that jurors are competent, unbiased and impartial, and the decision of how to conduct voir dire of prospective jurors rests within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 540 (Tenn. 1994).
The record indicates that after five and one half days of voir dire, the trial court decided that the process was taking too long. The trial court therefore decided that it would conduct the individual voir dire of the potential jurors and it would then give counsel for the State and the defense the opportunity to question the potential jurors about any ambiguous answers. The trial court then conducted individual voir dire and defense counsel was allowed to question the potential jurors about pretrial publicity and about their views on the death penalty.
Appellants' only allegation as to how they were prejudiced by the trial court's method of conducting voir dire is the vague statement that "they could not get a feel of the true feeling of the jurors concerning the death penalty." Indeed, Appellants have failed to indicate anything they could or would have done differently if the trial court had conducted voir dire differently. In addition, Appellants have failed to identify a single instance in which they were prevented from asking questions of a potential juror. Further, Appellants have not even argued that any of the jurors who were actually selected through this method of voir dire were biased or prejudiced. Indeed, the partial excerpts that are contained in the record indicate that the trial court excused jurors who indicated that they would be unable to be impartial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it conducted voir dire in the manner that it did. This issue has no merit.
VII. JURY SELECTION EXPERT
Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it revoked its authorization for funds to pay for a jury selection expert. We find no error here.
The record indicates that on March 7, 1994, the trial court granted Appellants' request for funds to pay for a jury selection expert. Appellants then had the assistance of jury selection expert Margie Fargo during the initial jury selection that began on January 22, 1996. Although it is not clear from the record, the trial court apparently did not empanel this jury because the jury pool was too small. Subsequently, during an ex parte hearing on June 18, 1996, the trial court revoked its authorization of funds to pay for a jury selection expert. The trial court reasoned that because defense counsel had spent approximately one and one-half weeks working with Fargo during the first jury selection process, defense counsel had acquired the knowledge that was necessary to effectively select a jury. Thus, the trial court ruled that continued employment of a jury selection expert was not necessary to ensure that Appellants received a fair trial.
During an ex parte hearing on July 29, 1996, Appellants asked the trial court to reconsider its denial of funds for a jury selection expert. Appellants argued that a jury selection expert was necessary in every capital case and in addition, a jury selection expert was needed in this case because defense counsel had never selected a "death qualified" jury before. The trial court ruled that Appellants' right to a fair trial would not be violated by discontinuing the jury selection expert services. The trial court stated that because defense counsel had already been instructed
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