Thornton v. State3/28/2001
oorboard. Hamilton asked who was driving the red truck. Thornton replied, "I am." According to Thornton, there were no other occupants in the vehicle. The vehicle was registered to Thornton. When Hamilton asked the appellant for his driver's license, Thornton stated, "I'm drunk." The bystander drove away alone in a blue vehicle. There were no identified eyewitnesses to the accident, but steam rising from the truck's radiator indicated it was a fresh scene. Hamilton observed Thornton's slurred speech, glassy bloodshot eyes, lack of balance and unsteadiness, and detected the strong odor of intoxicant. He also noticed a reddish discoloration on Thornton's face, consistent with deployment of an air bag such as had occurred on the driver's side of the red truck. Hamilton did not conduct field sobriety tests at that time, because he felt the defendant might possibly hurt himself trying to perform the tests. During book-in, Thornton urinated on himself without requesting access to a restroom. Sobriety tests conducted at the station revealed Thornton could not stand on one leg. Asked if he had been drinking, Thornton stated yes, he had been drinking alcohol, and a lot. He stated his last drink was consumed at 12:00, and he thought it was 1:00 at that moment.
Citing Coleman v. State, 704 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd), and McCafferty v. State, 748 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no pet.), the appellant argues that the State failed to produce sufficient corroboration for Thornton's admissions that he was drunk and that he had been driving. Several courts have declined to follow Coleman and McCafferty, either for utilizing the now-discarded alternate reasonable hypothesis construct, or for suggesting that the identity of the perpetrator is part of the corpus delecti of the offense of driving while intoxicated. See Chaloupka v. State, 20 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2000, pet. denied); Purvis v. State, 4 S.W.3d 118, 120 (Tex. App.--Waco 1999, no pet.); O'Neal v. State, 999 S.W.2d 826, 832 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1999, no pet.); Folk v. State, 797 S.W.2d 141, 143 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990, pet. ref'd).
The accused's extra-judicial confession cannot, standing alone, furnish the corpus delecti of the offense. Threet v. State, 157 Tex. Crim . 497, 250 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952). But proof of the corpus delicti need not be made independently from the confession. "If there is some evidence corroborating the confession, the confession may be used to aid in the establishment of the corpus delicti." Self v. State, 513 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Nor must the corroborating evidence establish the commission of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. "Because the rule peremptorily reduces the weight of admissible evidence for policy reasons originated by this Court without express legislative sanction, we have held that the quantum of independent evidence necessary to corroborate the corpus delicti in a criminal prosecution relying upon the extra-judicial confession of an accused need not be great." Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65, 71-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Evidence suffices which renders the corpus delicti more probable than it would be without the evidence. Id. Not being part of the corpus delicti, identity may be established solely through an extra-judicial confession. Id. "A confession is sufficient if there be such extrinsic corroborative circumstances as will, taken in connection with the confession, produce conviction of defendant's guilt in the minds of a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. State, 29 Tex. Crim. 458, 16 S.W. 247, 249 (Tex. Ct. App. 1891).
In a variety of cases, the circumstantial evidence collected from the sc
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