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City Of Walla Walla v. Topel2/8/2001
1, 8, 969 P.2d 21 (1998)).
Statutes should be construed to effect their purpose. Unlikely, absurd or strained consequences should be avoided. State v. Fjermestad, 114 Wn.2d 828, 835, 791 P.2d 897 (1990). When a statute is susceptible to differing interpretations, the construction that best advances the overall intent of the Legislature will be adopted. Hart v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 91 Wn.2d 197, 203, 588 P.2d 204 (1978).
'If the statute is unambiguous, its meaning is to be derived from the language of the statute alone.' Cherry, 116 Wn.2d at 799 (citing In re Eaton, 110 Wn.2d 892, 898, 757 P.2d 961 (1988)). 'If, however, the intent of the statute is not clear from the language of the statute by itself, the court may resort to statutory construction. Such construction may include the consideration of legislative history.' Cherry, 116 Wn.2d at 799 (citing Dep't of Transp. v. State Employees' Ins. Bd., 97 Wn.2d 454, 458, 645 P.2d 1076 (1982)).
In 1998, the State Legislature passed Second Substitute House Bill 3089, entitled 'Drunk Driving - Limiting Deferred Prosecution Program Eligibility.' See Laws of 1998, ch. 208. The act was effective on January 1, 1999. Among other changes, the act amended RCW 10.05.010 and RCW 10.05.160.
RCW 10.05.010 was revised to read:
A person charged with a traffic infraction, misdemeanor, or gross misdemeanor under Title 46 RCW shall not be eligible for a deferred prosecution program unless the court makes specific findings pursuant to RCW 10.05.020. Such person shall not be eligible for a deferred prosecution program more than once in any five-year period. Laws of 1998, ch. 208, sec. 1. RCW 10.05.160 was revised:
The prosecutor may appeal an order granting deferred prosecution on any or all of the following grounds:
(1) Prior deferred prosecution has been granted to the defendant within five years; Laws of 1998, ch. 208, sec. 4.
Mr. Topel argues that these revisions are ambiguous because it can be construed either that a defendant is eligible to receive one deferred prosecution in a lifetime, or one deferred prosecution after January 1, 1999, the effective date of the act. Mr. Topel bases his argument on the assertion that throughout the legislative history the word 'lifetime' appears, yet that word is 'conspicuously' absent from the final text.
However, Mr. Topel's interpretation of the amendments is not based on the plain meaning of the words, nor does his interpretation best advance the overall intent of the Legislature. First, the plain meaning of the amendments is clear: a defendant may receive one and only one deferred prosecution in his or her lifetime. The Legislature took away the ability to obtain deferred prosecution once every five years. Instead, the new language allows one deferred prosecution.
Moreover, as the State points out, Mr. Topel's interpretation that a defendant may have one deferred prosecution after the effective date could lead to an absurd result--a defendant could receive a deferred prosecution for both a December 31, 1998 conviction as well as for a January 2, 1999 conviction. The Legislature eliminated the five-year waiting period between deferred prosecutions not to allow such deferrals more frequently, but to allow them less frequently. Ample evidence of this intent is found not only in the plain text, but also in the legislative history. Both the text of the amendments and the legislative history indicate that, by these changes, the Legislature intended to allow one deferred prosecution per lifetime per defendant.
Mr. Topel also contends that the amendment offen
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