Sampsell v. State2/2/2001
ourt is silent as to whether the sentences were imposed to run consecutively or concurrently. Our rule is clear with respect to such discrepancies:
We have held that, when a discrepancy exists between the oral pronouncement and the written order, the oral pronouncement prevails. Lane v. State, 663 P.2d 175, 176 (Wyo.1983). Smith v. State, 985 P.2d 961, 963 (Wyo. 1999). See also Van Riper v. State, 882 P.2d 230, 238 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Schuler v. State, 668 P.2d 1333, 1341 (Wyo. 1983)); Christensen v. State, 854 P.2d 675, 678 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting United States v. Pugliese, 860 F.2d 25, 30 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067 (1989)); Krow v. State, 840 P.2d 261, 265 (Wyo. 1992); McGraw v. State, 770 P.2d 234, 235 (Wyo. 1989); and Fullmer v. Meacham, 387 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Wyo. 1964). Sampsell has appealed from the Judgment and Sentence of the Court, and his stance in the appeal correctly assumes that the sentences were imposed to run consecutively.
[ ] Sampsell points out that this Court has rejected the common-law view that a sentence is not subject to appellate review if it is within the minimum and maximum limits set by statute. Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Wyo. 1983). Two years later, the standard was explained in Volz v. State, 707 P.2d 179, 184 (Wyo. 1985):
The standard this court follows on review of sentencing is well established. This court will not reverse a sentence which is within the statutory limits absent a clear abuse of discretion. Kallas v. State, Wyo., 704 P.2d 693 (1985); Wright v. State, Wyo. 703 P.2d 1102 (1985); Munden v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 621, 626 (1985); Young v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1985); Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 692 P.2d 911, 930 (1984); Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991, 1008 (1984); Ventling v. State, supra, 676 P.2d at 574 [(Wyo. 1984)]; Eaton v. State, Wyo., 660 P.2d 803, 806 (1983); Taylor v. State, Wyo., 658 P.2d 1297, 1299 (1983); Wright v. State, Wyo. 670 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1983); Daniel v. State, supra, 644 P.2d at 178 [(Wyo. 1982)]; Cyrus v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 900, 903 (1982); Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107, 1112 (1981); Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378, 380 (1979); Hanson v. State, Wyo., 590 P.2d 832, 836 (1979); Smith v. State, Wyo., 564 P.2d 1194, 1202 (1977); Daellenbach v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 679, 683 (1977); Bird v. State, 36 Wyo. 532, 257 P. 2, 3 (1927); State v. Sorrentino, 36 Wyo. 111, 253 P. 14, 16 (1927).
This court in Ventling v. State, supra, reiterated the definition of "abuse of discretion" which applies to sentencing review:
"'"A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *"' Wright v. State, supra, 670 P.2d at 1092, quoting Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980)." [Ventling], 676 P.2d at 575.
While sentencing involves consideration of two broad categories--the circumstances surrounding the crime, and the character of the criminal , Young v. State, supra, 695 P.2d at 1057; Ventling v. State, supra, 676 P.2d at 575--after reviewing the record, we hold that the trial court gave proper consideration to both of these categories.
[ ] Sampsell first argues that the sentences that were imposed demonstrate an abuse of discretion. He contends that the prosecuting attorney and the district court judge focused on the willfulness of the offense, and points out that, of course, willfulness is no
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