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State v. Tovar6/19/2002
and you waived application for a court appointed attorney. I am sorry. You applied, but it was denied due to the fact you are dependent upon your parents. Mr. Tovar, did you want to represent yourself at today's hearing or did you want to take some time to hire an attorney to represent you?
THE DEFENDANT: No, I will represent myself.
THE COURT: Mr. Tovar, has anyone promised you anything or threatened you in any way in order to convince you to proceed here today without having an attorney present?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
Tovar's motion for adjudication of law point asserted his waiver of counsel in 1996 was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the district court failed to address the following five matters during the 1996 colloquy: (1) the possible defenses to the charge, (2) circumstances of mitigation, (3) that OWI is an enhanced penalty offense, (4) an admonishment of the usefulness of an attorney, and (5) the danger of proceeding without an attorney. The district court found Tovar's waiver of counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and denied the relief requested in the motion. The court held a stipulated bench trial and found Tovar guilty on both charges. Tovar appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
We review the ruling of the district court on the defendant's motion to adjudicate law points for the correction of legal error. State v. Mann, 463 N.W.2d 883, 883 (Iowa 1990). To the extent Tovar's claims raise constitutional issues, our review is de novo. State v. Moe, 379 N.W.2d 347, 350 (Iowa 1985).
III. MERITS.
Tovar contends the district court erred in overruling his motion to adjudicate law points. Tovar argues his current conviction cannot be enhanced from OWI second to OWI third because his waiver of counsel in his 1996 plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to self-representation. State v. Martin, 608 N.W.2d 445, 449-50 (Iowa 2000). Before the right to self-representation attaches, the defendant must voluntarily elect to proceed without counsel by 'knowingly and intelligently' waiving his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 450 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 582 (1975)). A valid waiver requires an understanding of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. State v. Cooley, 608 N.W.2d 9, 15 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted). Furthermore, a criminal defendant must be admonished as to the usefulness of an attorney at the particular proceeding, and made cognizant of the danger of continuing without counsel. Id. (citations omitted).
*3 The State concedes the district court failed to address the five items listed in Tovar's motion; however, the State contends a full admonition of the dangers of self-representation is not required when a defendant enters a guilty plea to a criminal charge. The State argues the authorities cited by Tovar, including Martin and Cooley, concern self-representation at trial and are not applicable to self-representation in a guilty plea.
In support of this contention the State relies primarily on State v. Cashman, 491 N.W.2d 462, 462 (S.D.1992), where the defendant challenged the enhancement of his sentence for driving under the influence contending his two prior convictions failed to reflect a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel prior to entry of the uncounseled guilty pleas on which the convictions were based. Id. In Cashman, the South Dakota Supreme Court determined a Faretta-type
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