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Smith v. State5/26/2000
(d); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1104-05 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Vice v. United States, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); United States v. Lind, 542 F.2d 598, 599 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 947, 97 S.Ct. 1585, 51 L.Ed.2d 796 (1977). Hence, we conclude that the trial court's restriction of the impeachment of Mr. Thames' general credibility by cross-examination regarding his juvenile record was not inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause.
"....
"We are not convinced on the record of this case, that trial court abused its discretion. We cannot perceive that such impeachment might have affected the outcome." 392 A.2d at 992-93.
See also State v. Wilson, 16 Wash.App. 434, 557 P.2d 18, 21 (1976), review denied, 99 Wash. 2d 1015 (1977) ("If it was the purpose of defense counsel to impeach the testimony of Thomas by demonstrating his bias within the rule of Davis, it was incumbent upon him to make this purpose known to the trial court in his offer of proof."); Bellinder v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 499, 230 N.W. 2d 770 (1975) ("The problem created by an inadequate record is particularly apparent in this case because of the limited factual applicability of Davis v. Alaska, supra.").
The above-quoted portion of the record reflects that defense counsel sought to elicit this testimony for the purpose of attacking M.A.'s credibility -- not to show any bias that M.A. had in favor of the State. This conclusion is supported by the record. Before trial Smith filed a motion styled as a "Motion to Compel Disclosure of Existence and Substance of Promises of Immunity, Leniency, or Preferential Treatment." (R. 143.) This motion requested the State to disclose any deals that it had made with any State witnesses. This motion was granted, and at a pretrial hearing the following occurred:
"The Court: ... Mr. Brandyburg [prosecutor], do you know if anyone would be testifying in this case pursuant to any sort of a bargain with the district attorney? "Mr. Brandyburg: Judge, based on the information and belief, to this point there are no agreements. The State is aware of its obligations to reveal any agreements, as such, as they arise, and I'm sure Ms. Davis [prosecutor] will do that. At this point, no, sir, there are none.
"....
"Ms. Davis: Your Honor, for the record, there have been no agreements with any parties in this case." (R. 4-10.)
The record clearly shows that M.A. was not offered any reward from the State in exchange for her testimony at Smith's trial.
Based on the application of the above principles of law, our review of this issue is limited to a plain-error analysis. Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P. However, we emphasize that our affirmance of this issue is not dependent on application of the plain-error doctrine. The trial court's ruling was not error, much less, plain error.
Smith argues, citing the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), that he was denied his Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation on cross-examination when the trial court sustained the State's objection to the question concerning M.A.'s residence. In Davis, the state's key witness, a juvenile, identified the defendant as the man he had seen on a road near his family's house at the point where a stolen safe was later discovered. At the time of the defendant's trial and at the time of the events the witness testified to, the witness was on probation, having been adjudicated a delinquent for two burglaries. The defendant argued that he should have been allowed to reveal to jurors the witness's status as a juvenile probationer to show
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