State v. Jones6/15/2000
2d 146, 153 (1993), we rejected this argument and held that if the receipt or expectation of pecuniary value is a cause of, or a motive for the murder, the F.5 factor applies. That is not to say that all robberies suffice to invoke the factor. Instead, robbery must be a motive or cause of the murder, rather than just the result. See, e.g., State v. Correll, 148 Ariz. 468, 479, 715 P.2d 721, 732 (1986). Thus, under our interpretation of the F.5 factor, Jones's argument on the merits of the F.5 factor fails.
Furthermore, under independent review, we find Jones and his co-defendant clearly intended to rob and murder their victims. They murdered the individuals to facilitate the robberies and then escape punishment. In the first robbery, Jones himself shot unsuspecting victim Chip O'Dell in the back of the head as he entered the Moon Smoke Shop. A second victim was hunted down by Scott Nordstrom and shot while trying to escape. Jones also attempted to shoot the remaining witnesses, despite the lack of provocation. All of these factors indicate that both Jones and Nordstrom began the robbery intending to murder anyone who happened to be in the store at the time. Likewise, in the second robbery, the victims were shot execution style, although none attempted to challenge the defendants. These murders were not "robberies gone bad." Instead, Jones and his co-defendant set out to accomplish the results they obtained, simply to acquire the money. Thus, the F.5 factor applies and has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
B.
Jones's final point of error involving sentencing concerns the trial court's finding that the A.R.S. § 13-703.F.7 aggravating factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 13-703.F.7 provides that when a "defendant committed the offense while in the custody of or on authorized or unauthorized release from the state department of corrections, a law enforcement agency or a county or city jail," that fact may be considered an aggravating factor in the capital case. Here, Jones argues that the factor was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt because the only evidence presented was testimony from his parole officer, Ron Kirby, that Jones was, in fact, on parole at the time of the murders. Jones asserts that these statements, standing alone, do not meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
During the mitigation hearing, however, Jones failed to object to the testimony, to cross-examine the witness, or to challenge the evidence. Furthermore, in the pre-sentencing mitigation memorandum submitted by the defense to the trial court, Jones failed to address this issue at all. Instead, he now raises it for the first time on appeal. In the absence of contravention, the testimony alone provides sufficient grounds for the trial court's determination. The parole officer knew whether Jones was, in fact, on parole at the time, and the statute requires nothing more. Based on the testimony of the parole officer, we find that the F.7 factor has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV.
Jones contends that the trial court erred when it imposed the death penalty. We independently review both the aggravating and mitigating factors pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703.01 and State v. Wood, 180 Ariz. 53, 68, 881 P.2d 1158, 1173 (1994). For the following reasons, we uphold the trial court's sentence.
A.
In addition to the A.R.S. § 13-703.F.5 and F.7 factors discussed above, the trial court found the existence of the aggravating factors F.1 (the defendant has been convicted of another offense for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death is imposable), F.2 (the defendant was previously convicted of a serious o
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Arizona DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|