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State v. Walshire10/10/2001
Jeremiah Walshire was convicted of driving under suspension, and he appealed, claiming error in the court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.
The Marion Police Department received an anonymous telephone call about a vehicle with a suspected drunk driver. The call was apparently made on a cellular phone because the caller was following the subject car. The arresting officer testified at the hearing on the defendant's motion *626 to suppress, outlining the sparse facts surrounding his stop of Walshire's vehicle:
Q. Okay. What about Mr. Walshire first brought him to your attention? A. We had--dispatch reported to me over the radio that a cell phone caller was behind a vehicle on Highway 13 they thought was drunk.
Q. And did they--were you told by dispatch any particulars about the vehicle? A. License plate, make and model of the vehicle.
....
Q. Okay. Were you told why this vehicle was suspected of driving drunk? A. I believe it was the caller stated they were driving in the median.
The officer testified that dispatch reported the caller would not give a name.
The arresting officer located the car and stopped it, solely on the basis of the call; he did not personally observe any behavior that would generate reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. The defendant was not arrested for drunk driving, but he was charged with driving under suspension in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.21 (1999).
The defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop on the ground the officer did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to make an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), because the information provided by the anonymous caller was not sufficiently reliable and was not corroborated by independent observations of the officer. The district court overruled Walshire's motion to suppress, relying on State v. Markus, 478 N.W.2d 405 (Iowa Ct.App.1991). On a stipulated record, the court found the defendant guilty of driving under suspension.
II. Standard of Review.
Appellate review of claimed violations of constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment is de novo in light of the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Ortiz, 618 N.W.2d 556, 558-59 (Iowa 2000).
III. The Merits.
To justify a Terry stop, an officer must have specific and articulable cause to reasonably believe criminal activity may be afoot. State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 357-58 (Iowa 2000). This quantum of evidence necessary to justify a Terry stop is often referred to as "reasonable suspicion." On appeal the defendant occasionally discusses principles of "probable cause" rather than "reasonable suspicion," as involved in this case. There is, of course, a substantial difference.
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 (1990).
In State v. Markus, the case relied on by the district court, the police received an anonymous tip from a motorist using a cellular phone to report he was following a pickup that "was all over the roadway." 478 N.W.2d at 407. The caller, as in the present case, reported the description of the vehicle, its license number, location, and direction of travel. The officers found the vehicle but made no independent observations as to how it was being operated. They sto
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