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Miller v. State4/14/2000
JO-029C
The state accused Wilton Miller of being a habitual violator, making an illegal u-turn, driving without insurance, driving without proof of insurance, and driving with a revoked license. Miller denied the accusations and elected to represent himself without counsel.
At trial, the state presented a police officer who testified that on July 19, 1999, he saw Miller almost hit another vehicle when he made a u-turn in front of that vehicle, that he stopped Miller because of the improper u-turn, that he discovered Miller's license had been suspended, and that Miller had only expired insurance cards but no proof of current insurance on his car. The state also introduced certified documents from the Georgia Department of Public Safety showing that Miller had previously been declared a habitual violator, that his driver's license had been revoked several years ago, and that his license had not been reinstated.
The jury found Miller guilty of all the charged offenses. And the court entered a judgment of conviction on the verdict, sentencing Miller to serve two consecutive twelve month sentences.Miller appeals pro se, asserting nineteen enumerations of error. We find that none of the enumerated errors is meritorious, and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
1. Miller claims that at his first appearance hearing on July 20, 1999, the magistrate refused his request to represent himself. The burden is on the complaining party, including a pro se appellant, to compile a complete record of what happened below, and when this is not done there is nothing for an appellate court to review. Miller has not met this burden because there is no transcript of the first appearance hearing. Nor is there any other evidence in the record showing that the magistrate in fact disregarded a knowing and voluntary waiver by Miller of his right to counsel.
Furthermore, we note that Miller was allowed to exercise his right to represent himself at trial. So we fail to see how the appointment of counsel at the first appearance hearing, if such appointment actually occurred over Miller's knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, constitutes a basis for reversing Miller's convictions.
2. Miller complains that at his commitment hearing held on July 23, 1999, the state denied him the right to due process by moving to increase his bond and by initiating an unlawful arraignment. There is no transcript of the hearing in question and Miller has not shown by the record how a motion to increase his bond denied him due process or that there was an unlawful arraignment. Miller therefore has not met his burden of proving error by the record.
3. Miller contends the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss all the charges on the ground that the officer who arrested him did not appear at the commitment hearing. This contention is not supported by the record because there is no transcript of that hearing.
Moreover, Miller has not indicated why the officer's alleged non- appearance at the hearing would have provided a basis for the court to dismiss all of the charges brought against him by the state. The only thing we can presume is that Miller may have intended to claim that the state could not have proved probable cause at the hearing without the officer. But hearsay is admissible at a commitment hearing, so even without the arresting officer's testimony, the state still could have established probable cause through other hearsay evidence. In any event, we do not know exactly what happened at the hearing because of the absence of a transcript.
Furthermore, at this point, the jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable dou
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