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Conrad v. Director of Revenue6/30/2000
eligible because of the reasons listed in section 302.309.3(5)(b), including a felony conviction involving the use of a motor vehicle. Id. at 707. The Court concluded that Hagan's felony conviction for DWI, a felony involving the use of a motor vehicle, disqualified him from a limited driving privilege under section 302.309.3(5)(b). Id. at 706. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court had no authority to grant Hagan limited driving privileges.
Here, the Department of Revenue records attached to the Director's answer show that Conrad was convicted on September 27, 1993 of driving while intoxicated, a violation of section 577.010. The court sentenced Conrad to three years in the Department of Corrections with a 120-day call-back. The records as a whole indicate the conviction was for a felony involving a motor vehicle.
At the trial, Conrad did not dispute the records filed by Director. These records are sufficient to show that Conrad had a prior felony DWI conviction, even though they were never formally offered into evidence. Lane v. Director of Revenue, 996 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999). Moreover, Conrad had the burden at trial to prove that he was eligible for a limited driving privilege. Section 302.309.3(6)(a). Conrad offered no evidence to show he was statutorily eligible based on Director's answer.
Under Hagan, Conrad is statutorily ineligible for a limited driving privilege because of his felony conviction. Hagan, 968 S.W.2d at 706-07. Accordingly, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant such privileges and could take no other action except to dismiss Conrad's petition. Sanders v. Director of Revenue, 998 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999); See also, Rider v. Director of Revenue, 5 S.W.3d 211, 212-13 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999).
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
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