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Baldwin v. Director of Revenue6/27/2000
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Platte County, Hon. Daniel M. Czamanske
Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. Spinden and Newton, JJ., concur.
Opinion:
On October 17, 1998, Parkville police officer Jon Jordan observed Bradley Baldwin driving his truck in excess of the posted speed limit and weaving between lanes. Officer Jordan stopped the Baldwin vehicle, and when he requested that Baldwin exit the vehicle, the officer noted a strong odor of alcohol. Baldwin admitted to drinking and subsequently failed a field sobriety test, and was arrested for driving while intoxicated, section 577.010. Baldwin was transported to the Parkville Police Department, where his blood alcohol level was recorded at .133%. He was issued a notice of suspension of his driving privileges, to which he filed a request for administrative review. An administrative hearing was conducted which upheld the suspension of Baldwin's driving privileges by the Director of Revenue (Director). On March 3, 1999, Baldwin filed a petition for de novo review in the Circuit Court of Platte County, arguing that section 302.535(2) was unconstitutional and deprived him of a meaningful hearing before an impartial tribunal prior to entry of the order of suspension. The case was heard on July 14, 1999, and the court took the matter under advisement. On July 16, 1999, the trial court entered a judgment for Director, finding that "Section 302.535(2) RSMo is constitutional and that Petitioner is not entitled to have his suspension treated as a 'zero tolerance' suspension and that Petitioner is not eligible for expungement of his suspension as provided for 'zero tolerance' suspensions pursuant to 302.545 RSMo." This appeal followed.
In his sole point of error on appeal, Baldwin argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted and applied the law when it determined that the record of his license suspension was not subject to expungement under section 302.545, and that he was required to file proof of financial responsibility for reinstatement of his driving privileges, because he was under 21 years of age at the time of his arrest. He relies on the 1996 amendments to sections 302.505 and 302.541, as well as the 1996 enactment of section 302.545, otherwise generally known as the "Zero Tolerance Law." He contends that pursuant to these statutes drivers under 21 years of age whose privileges have been suspended or revoked pursuant to section 302.505 are exempt from filing proof of financial responsibility and are entitled to expungement of records, even if the underage driver's blood alcohol content exceeded .10%. The Director argues, without citation to authority, that Baldwin's construction of the statute is contrary to the General Assembly's intent in passing the Zero Tolerance Law and that the law should be construed to contain a cap on blood alcohol content of .099%.
Appellate review of this case is governed by Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). The decision of the trial court will be affirmed unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Id. at 32. We review the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision. Miller v. Director of Revenue, 719 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Mo. banc 1986). However, " eference to the trial court's findings is not required when the evidence is uncontroverted and the case is virtually one of admitting the facts or when the evidence is not in conflict." Fischer v. Director of Revenue, 928 S.W.2d 424, 425-26 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996)(citations omitted).
Our purpose when interpreting statutes is to det
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