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State v. Hughes11/12/2004
Aaron R. Hughes appeals his conviction and sentence for driving under the influence (DUI), challenging the district court's interpretation and application of K.S.A.2002 Supp. 8-1567(1)(3), as well as its constitutionality as applied. We affirm.
Factual Overview
Because of his two prior DUI convictions in 1992 and 1995, Hughes was charged in 2002 with a third offense DUI, a felony, pursuant to K.S.A.2002 Supp. 8- 1567(f). Hughes filed a pre-trial motion to strike from consideration the two prior convictions, arguing that the 2001 amendment of K.S.A.2002 Supp. 8- 1567(1)(3) barred consideration of convictions that predated to the effective date of the amendment, since it omitted the phrase "including prior to the effective date of this act," which had appeared in previous versions of the statute.
The district court concluded that K.S.A.2002 Supp. 8-1567(1)(3) is unambiguous and that all DUI convictions within an offender's lifetime, including those prior to the effective date of the 2001 amendment, should be taken into account when determining the sentence to be imposed for a first, second, third, fourth, or subsequent DUI conviction. Hughes was convicted after a bench trial on stipulated facts.
Standard of Review
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law and our review of the district court's interpretation and application is unlimited. Williamson v. City of Hays, 275 Kan. 300, 305, 64 P.3d 364 (2003). Similarly, we exercise unlimited review of challenges to the constitutional application of statutes. State v. Beard, 274 Kan. 181, 185, 49 P.3d 492 (2002).
Did the District Court Err in Its Interpretation and Application of K.S.A.2002 Supp. 8-1567(1)(3)?
Hughes argues that the legislature's deletion of the phrase "prior to the effective date of this act" from the 2001 amendment of the operative statute, since employed in 15 previous versions of the same statute, indicates legislative intent "that the statutory changes would not be applicable to prior convictions that occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment." We conclude that Hughes' suggested interpretation is contrary to the plain meaning of the amendment.
The provision in question, K.S.A.2002 Supp. 8-1567(1)(3), provides that "any convictions occurring during a person's lifetime shall be taken into account when determining the sentence to be imposed for a first, second, third, fourth, or subsequent offender." As mentioned above, until July 1, 2001, the statute provided that DUI convictions over 5 years old could not be used for sentencing enhancement purposes. See K.S.A.2000 Supp. 8-1567(k)(3).
The omitted language was unnecessary in the amended statute, because its language makes clear that any convictions occurring during a person's lifetime are taken into account for sentencing purposes. The words "any" and "lifetime" are common words that convey a definite meaning. "Ordinary words are to be given their ordinary meaning, and a statute should not be so read as to add that which is not readily found therein or to read out what as a matter of ordinary English language is in it. [Citation omitted.]" GT, Kansas, L.L.C. v. Riley County Register of Deeds, 271 Kan. 311, 316, 22 P.3d 600 (2001).
**2 It would be unreasonable and contrary to the plain language of the statute to conclude that only DUI convictions occurring after July 1, 2001, may be considered in determining the sentence to be imposed for a repeat DUI offender. "As a general rule, statutes are construed to avoid unreasonable results. There is a presumption that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation. [Citation omitted.]" In re M.R., 272 Kan. 1335, 1342, 38 P.3d 694 (2002). The statute provides that any convictions occurring during a person's lifetime are ta
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