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Stiens v. Director of Revenue5/2/2000
Petitioner, Joseph H. Stiens, Jr., appeals from the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of St. Louis County sustaining the suspension of his driver's license. The trial de novo was heard by a commissioner who made findings and recommendations. The presiding judge of the circuit court entered judgment on the commissioner's findings the same day. Petitioner challenges the findings on the merits and also claims a denial of due process because he did not have a meaningful opportunity for a hearing by an Article V judge before judgment was entered, as required by Dabin v. Director of Revenue, 9 S.W.3d 610 (Mo. banc 2000). The issue is whether the proceedings on petitioner's motion for new trial which was heard by the commissioner and denied by the circuit court over a week after the commissioner issued her findings, gave petitioner a meaningful opportunity to be heard. We hold that there was a deprivation of due process under Dabin and reverse and remand.
Petitioner was arrested for driving while intoxicated and was notified that his license was to be suspended. The Department of Revenue conducted an administrative hearing and ordered petitioner's driver's license suspended. Petitioner requested a trial de novo in the circuit court pursuant to Section 302.535 RSMo (Cum. Supp. 1999). The presiding judge of the circuit court assigned the case to a traffic commissioner who conducted a trial on December 7, 1998 and entered her findings and recommendations on January 13, 1999. The presiding judge entered judgment on the commissioner's findings the same day. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for new trial or, in the alternative, for judgment, which the commissioner heard on March 15, 1999. At the hearing petitioner requested a hearing on the merits before the presiding judge. The commissioner denied the motion for new trial and alternative motion for judgment by order dated March 22, 1999. The presiding judge adopted the commissioner's findings on March 31, 1999.
Petitioner raises four points on appeal. The first three points address whether required findings were made and the sufficiency of the evidence. In his fourth point petitioner asserts that he was denied due process because he was not accorded a meaningful opportunity for hearing or review before an Article V judge. Because the fourth point is dispositive, we address it first.
Section 302.535.1 gives a person whose driver's license has been suspended or revoked a statutory right to judicial review by trial de novo in the circuit court. This procedure satisfies the due process requirement of a full, post-deprivation hearing as well as the judicial review required by Article V, Section 18 of the Missouri Constitution. Jarvis v. Director of Revenue, 804 S.W.2d 22, 24-25 (Mo. banc 1991). " trial de novo allows the circuit court to determine for itself, on evidence presented to it afresh, the propriety of the Department's order suspending a driving privilege." Id. at 25.
Under Section 479.500 RSMo (Cum. Supp. 1999) a traffic commissioner may "hear in the first instance" evidence and make recommendations. This function is not the exercise of judicial power. Dabin, 9 S.W.3d at 614. However, a petitioner must be accorded procedural due process in the trial de novo. Id. at 615.
In Dabin, the court set out the applicable principles of procedural due process:
Due process applies to the suspension or revocation of a driver's license by the state. " icenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112 97 S. Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977). "The due process clause requires a 'meaningful' hearing in which
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