State v. Jones4/14/2000
requested jury instruction, which would have tracked the language of Padilla, 1997-NMSC-022, 7.
DISCUSSION
Battery upon a peace officer is "the unlawful, intentional touching or application of force to the person of a peace officer while he is in the lawful discharge of his duties, when done in a rude, insolent or angry manner." Section 30-22-24(A). The purpose of the battery upon a peace officer statute "is to protect the safety and authority of peace officers." Padilla, 1997-NMSC-022, 5 (emphasis omitted). Padilla found that the statute's felony sanctions were aimed at behavior that was above and beyond the "mere affronts to personal dignity" that are actionable under tort law. Id. 6. Therefore, it was inappropriate to graft the analysis of tort law onto this section of the criminal code. Padilla observed that the penalty for battery upon a peace officer, a fourth degree felony, was the same as that for an aggravated battery upon a peace officer, which requires "painful temporary disfigurement or temporary loss or impairment of the functions of any member or organ of the body." NMSA 1978, § 30-22-25(B) (1971). Both are punishable by eighteen months imprisonment. In balancing the conduct and penalties involved, the Court reasoned that only if the unlawful conduct comprising a battery upon a peace officer rises to the level of an "actual injury, actual threat to safety, or meaningful challenge to authority," could any logic be discerned from the punishment that accompanies the statute. Padilla, 1997-NMSC-022, 7. Otherwise, even a mundane civil battery, such as rudely grabbing a ticket from an officer's hands, or any other touching no matter how insignificant, could, at the prosecutor's whim, become punishable as a felony. The Supreme Court sought to avoid such an absurd result. See id. 6; see also State v. Ortega, 113 N.M. 437, 439, 827 P.2d 152, 154 (Ct. App. 1992).
Thereafter, the uniform jury instruction (UJI) for battery upon a peace officer was amended, ostensibly to conform with the holding of Padilla. See UJI 14-2211. Although Use Note 3 to the UJI acknowledges that Padilla defined unlawful conduct as that which "meaningfully challenges" an officer's authority, the text of the instruction omits the term "meaningfully." Id. Nor does the UJI use the word "actual" when describing the threat to an officer's safety. These terms were fundamental to the definition of unlawfulness in Padilla, and their absence from the amended UJI is inexplicable.
Because this Court is vested with the responsibility to review a UJI in the absence of controlling Supreme Court precedent, we must decide whether the amended UJI sufficiently states the law as applied to the facts of these particular prosecutions. See State v. Wilson, 116 N.M. 793, 795, 867 P.2d 1175, 1177 (1994) (holding that the "Court of Appeals is not precluded from considering error in jury instructions"). Thus, the question before us is twofold. First, must the jury instruction include the terms, "meaningful challenge," "actual threat," or "actual injury," if so requested? Second, can spitting on an officer constitute battery upon a peace officer, assuming a jury is properly instructed according to the evidence? We answer both questions in the affirmative.
The Jury Instruction for Section 30-22-24 after Padilla
In response to the first question, we think that Padilla requires the jury instruction to reflect the State's burden of proof, which includes an "actual injury, actual threat to safety, or meaningful challenge to authority," when the issue of a challenge to authority or threat to safety is in dispute and the defendant requests such language in the
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 New Mexico DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|