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State v. Hawn6/30/2000
rime took place at all no person other than Hawn could have committed it. Further, Hawn did not claim that another person had murdered Sue Jack. Instead, he denied that she was murdered at all. The only genuine issue, therefore, was whether Sue Jack was murdered or whether she committed suicide. Because the identity of the perpetrator of the State's murder alter-native was not in issue, evidence of Defendant Hawn's prior acts extrinsic to the operative facts of the crime alleged was not admissible per Evid.R. 404(B) to prove identity.
Neither does the evidence of the Defendant's other acts which the State was allowed to introduce satisfy the temporal and circumstantial requirements of Burson and Cherry. The crime was alleged to have occurred on February 21, 1998, and involved Hawn shooting Ms. Jack. The hair-pulling and black eye incident and the domestic violence calls took place in mid-to late November of 1997. They form no part of the immediate background of the crime charged, but are factually and chronologically separate from the operative facts the crime is alleged to have involved. State v. Eubank (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 183; Smith, supra. Neither are they inextricably related to it, lacking a reasonably close situational relationship and modal similarity to the operative facts of the alleged crime. Burson, supra; Curry, supra; State v. Hector (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 167. Therefore, even if the identity of the perpetrator of the crime alleged had been in issue, the other acts which this evidence involves was inadmissible to prove it.
In cursory fashion the State also mentions motive, intent, and the absence of mistake or accident as possible justifications for admitting the other acts evidence in its case against Hawn.
During the trial the State set forth no theory as to Hawn's motive and it offered no evidence in that regard. In his closing argument, the prosecutor made it very clear that Hawn's motive was irrelevant and not in issue. Under those circumstances, introduction of the other acts evidence here may not now be justified by the State as proof of motive.
Hawn's intent and the absence of mistake or accident on his part were likewise not in issue. Hawn's defense was not that he lacked any purpose or intent to cause the death of Sue Jack, or that he acted out of some sudden heat of passion, or that this shooting was accidental on his part. To the contrary, Hawn's defense was that he did not shoot Sue Jack, period. Under those circumstances the other acts evidence the State was allowed to introduce was not admissible to prove intent or the absence of mistake or accident on Hawn's part.
This evidence of Hawn's other crimes or acts of wrongdoing, specifically the testimony of police officers concerning the November 16, 1997, domestic violence incident and that of other witnesses concerning the hair-pulling injury and black eye that Sue Jack suffered at about the same time, was wholly independent of the offense for which Hawn was on trial and was not made admissible by Evid.R. 404(B). This evidence created the very inferential pattern which Evid.R. 404 prohibits; that because Hawn had committed other crimes or acts of wrongdoing in the past, he is a person of bad character who acted in conformity with that bad character on this occasion to commit the crime alleged. State v. Jamison (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 182; Smith, supra. Such evidence is highly inflammatory and unfairly prejudicial to a defendant's right to due process of law and to a fair trial on the particular charges involved which he is constitutionally guaranteed.
We are not unaware of the fact that crimes of domestic violence present unique and difficult problems, including probl
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