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State v. Lussier4/28/2000
t the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence should be applied in civil suspension hearings.
I.
Before considering whether the stops in the instant cases were lawful, we must consider whether a defendant in a civil suspension hearing may challenge the reasonableness of the underlying stop.
A.
Under 23 V.S.A. § 1205(h)(1)-(5), the issues at a final civil suspension hearing are limited to the following:
(1) whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating, attempting to operate or in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201 of this title;
(2) whether at the time of the request for the evidentiary test the officer informed the person of the person's rights and the consequences of taking and refusing the test . . .;
(3) whether the person refused to permit the test;
(4) whether the test was taken and the test results indicated that the person's alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more at the time of operati . . ., whether the testing methods used were valid and reliable and whether the test results were accurate and accurately evaluated. . . .;
(5) whether the requirements of section 1202 of this title [consent to taking of tests to determine blood alcohol content] were complied with.
According to the State, because the limited issues enumerated in § 1205(h) do not explicitly include whether reasonable grounds existed for the stop, the Legislature must not have intended to allow defendants in civil suspension proceedings to challenge the constitutionality of stops. See State v. Pollander, 167 Vt. 301, 308, 706 A.2d 1359, 1363 (1997) (Legislature intended to limit issues that may be presented in civil suspension hearings to those enumerated in statute). In the State's view, the reasonableness of the officer's belief that the defendant was driving while intoxicated, see § 1205(h)(1), may be satisfied solely on evidence of intoxication gathered after the stop - odor of alcohol, watery eyes, slurred speech, failure to perform dexterity tests, etc. - regardless of the lawfulness of the stop itself.
We are not persuaded by the State's argument. Our primary duty in construing a statute is to discern the intent of the Legislature by examining the language of the entire statute, along with its purpose, effects, and consequences. See Candido v. Polymers, Inc., 166 Vt. 15, 17, 687 A.2d 476, 478 (1996); State v. O'Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275, 682 A.2d 943, 946 (1996). While the Legislature plainly intended to expedite the adjudication of civil license suspensions, see State v. Strong, 158 Vt. 56, 61, 605 A.2d 510, 513 (1992), it was careful to ensure that all of the rights related to the taking of a blood or breath sample applied equally in both criminal and civil DUI proceedings. We find it unlikely that the Legislature intended to retain these statutorily created rights in civil suspension proceedings while stripping defendants in those proceedings of their constitutionally protected right to be free from unreasonable stops. Rather, we conclude that, in permitting defendants in a civil suspension proceeding to dispute whether the processing officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist was driving while intoxicated, the Legislature assumed that a constitutional stop would be a necessary predicate to finding "reasonable grounds" for suspicion of DUI. Nothing in the language of § 1205 or the purpose behind the statute suggests that the Legislature intended otherwise.
Section 1205(h)(1) permits defendants in civil suspension proceedings to challenge whether the arresting officer had reason
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