State v. Mollman12/23/2003
We review the court's decision under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Knecht, 1997 SD 53, , 563 NW2d 413, 417 (additional citation omitted).
. To prove that Mollman was guilty of vehicular homicide, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mollman:
1. was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage;
2. did not have a "design to effect death";
3. drove his vehicle in a negligent manner; and
4. thereby caused Severson's death.
SDCL 22-16-41. This statute requires a showing by the State that Defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the decedent's death. See generally, State v. Two Bulls, 1996 SD 53, 547 NW2d 764.
. This Court first addressed the issue of proximate causation under the vehicular homicide statute in Two Bulls, 1996 SD 53, 547 NW2d 764. We noted that a finding of ordinary negligence is sufficient to establish vehicular homicide and therefore the appropriate standard of causation is "that employed by tort law." Two Bulls, 1996 SD 53 at , 547 NW2d at 766 (citing Commonwealth v. Berggren, 398 Mass 338, 496 NE2d 660, 661-62 (1986)). Under tort law, the negligence of two or more can combine to cause the injury and each of the negligent actors may be held liable for the injury. Two Bulls, 1996 SD 53 at , 547 NW2d at 766 (citing W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 52 at 347-349 (5th Ed 1984)) (additional citations omitted)). Therefore, we held:
The negligence of another does not prevent conviction for vehicular battery or homicide, so long as the defendant's negligence is also a proximate cause of the victim's injuries or death.
Id. (citing State v. Theuring, 46 Ohio App3d 152, 546 NE2d 436, 438 (1988)). We accepted the proposition that:
[T]he negligence or unlawful acts of another driver which proximately contributed to the death, as distinguished from an independent intervening cause thereof, [are] not a defense if the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's negligence or unlawful acts were also a proximate cause of the death of another.
Id., (quoting State v. Rotella, 196 Neb. 741, 246 NW2d 74, 76 (1976) (additional citations omitted)). Simply stated, "The deceased's negligence is irrelevant absent evidence that would support a finding that [it] amounted to an independent intervening cause[.]" State v. Lamont, 2001 SD 92, , 631 NW2d 603, 609 n2 (quoting State v. Dionne, 442 A2d 876, 887 (RI 1982)). However, the defense is certainly entitled to present evidence that the decedent's actions constituted an independent intervening cause of death. Lamont, 2001 SD 92 at , 631 NW2d at 608 (citations omitted).
. This Court has defined independent intervening cause, stating:
When the natural and continuous sequence of causal connection between the negligent conduct and the injury is interrupted by a new and independent cause, which itself produces the injury, that intervening cause operates to relieve the original wrongdoer of liability. However, the intervening cause must be a superseding cause. It must so entirely supersede the operation of the defendant's negligence that it alone, without his negligence contributing thereto, produces the injury.
Braun v. New Hope Township, 2002 SD 67, , 646 NW2d 737, 740 (citing Schmeling v. Jorgensen, 77 SD 8, 18, 84 NW2d 558, 564 (1957) (internal citations omitted)).
. After the State made its motion to prohibit evidence of the lack of a motorcycle endorsement, the trial court requested that the defense present an offer of proof on the issue. The trial court instructed the defense attorney:
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